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RETROSPECT
Oral History: Justice Bernard S. Jefferson
Preface
The following is a transcript from a videotaped oral history of Justice Bernard S. Jefferson, formerly of the California Court of Appeal,
Second District. Justice Jefferson is probably best known as one of the
first black appointees to a high position in the California judiciary, and as
the author of the outstanding CaliforniaEvidence Benchbook. He is also
noted for his significant rulings as a trial judge. In his early career, Justice Jefferson was involved in major civil rights actions in the company of
Thurgood Marshall and other prominent black lawyers. In his later career, he served briefly as a pro tem appointee on the California Supreme
Court.
This transcript examines Justice Jefferson's full career and strong
opinions. The oral history and this transcript are products of the Committee on History of Law in California, a standing committee of the State
Bar of California. With the publishing efforts of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, we are pleased to make this work available for
study by historians and any other persons interested in the development
of California law, the life and career of Justice Jefferson, and the
landmark decisions of his era.
A primary objective of the Committee on History of Law in California is to foster the study and preservation of California's legal history.
The Committee accordingly desires to make the Jefferson project, and all
subsequent video oral histories, easily available to all interested scholars
and students. The Committee will complete the transcript from a similar
interview with Justice Otto Kaus, also to appear in a future issue of the
Hastings ConstitutionalLaw Quarterly. The Jefferson and Kaus projects
are the first entries in "The California Bar Oral History Series," a joint
effort of this Committee and California law schools.*
* The Committee on History of Law in California would like to express its thanks to the
individuals and California law schools which have made this project possible. Mr. David
Doyle, a member of the Committee from 1982 to 1986, researched and conducted the Jefferson
interview. Mr. Doyle is a litigation attorney practicing in Fresno, California.
[225]
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Biographical Sketch
Justice Bernard S. Jefferson's career has spanned half a century and
earned him the reputation as one of the most brilliant legal scholars of
The entire interview occurred on December 17, 1984 in three separate sessions of approximately two hours each. The interview occurred on the McGeorge campus, where the school
maintains professional video facilities. The studio resembles an attorney's office and measures
about twelve-by-twelve feet. Justice Jefferson sat at a desk near one corner of the room and
looked across the desk and slightly to his left at Mr. Doyle throughout the interview. The
single camera was stationary and stituated behind Mr. Doyle so Justice Jefferson would appear
to look directly toward it. Mr. Doyle, Justice Jefferson, and the camera operator were usually
the only individuals in the room.
The word-processing staff of California Western School of Law in San Diego prepared the
transcript from the videotapes through arrangements made by Neil T. Gotanda, a former professor at California Western and a member of the Committee. Laurene Wu McClain, now
chair of the Committee, compared the transcript to the tapes and edited the final product. She
also submitted the transcript to Justice Jefferson for his comments and for clarifications of any
inaudible or inaccurate statements. All significant differences between the videotapes and the
transcript are enclosed in brackets. Ms. McClain practices law in San Francisco and teaches
history at City College of San Francisco.
The editorial staff of the Hastings ConstitutionalLaw Quarterlyedited the submitted transcript and altered the order of the discussion. The editorial staff then submitted the edited
version to Ms. McClain and Justice Jefferson for their comments.
Matthew St. George, a Committee member practicing law with the Los Angeles City
Attorney's Office, wrote the introductory biographical sketch of Justice Jefferson.
The transcript and videotapes are available for research and other permitted uses. McGeorge School of Law, Hastings College of the Law, and the archives of the San Francisco
offices of the State Bar of California have copies of the Jefferson videotapes for future use. The
entire interview is on three VHS video cassettes; each tape is two hours in length. The State
Bar of California retains all copyright interests and other literary rights in the transcript and
tapes, including the right to reproduce or publish. No part of the transcript or tapes may be
quoted or otherwise reproduced in any manner without express written permission of the State
Bar of California. However, the Hastings ConstitutionalLaw Quarterlyhas the exclusive right
to publish the transcript for a period of three years commencing on the publication date of the
issue. The Quarterlymay grant written reprint requests provided such requests are within the
"fair use" doctrine. Requests for permission to quote for publication or to reproduce any part
of the works should be addressed to the Hastings ConstitutionalLaw Quarterly, 200 McAllister
Street, San Francisco, California 94102. Requests should identify specific passages or materials to be quoted or reproduced, anticipated uses of the passages or material, and identification
of the user.
Preparing this project-from the original interview to final publication-required the energies of Committee members under three chair persons. Each Committee chair serves for one
year. This project also required generous support from the McGeorge School of Law. We
thank the McGeorge deans and faculty and the technical services personnel who operated the
camera and made the tape. We thank Carol Hicke of the Regional Oral History Office at the
University of California, Berkeley, and her former colleague, Sarah L. Sharpe, Ph.D., who
shared their important advice and thoughts on preparing the final transcript for publication.
We are pleased to add our thanks to the editors of the Hastings ConstitutionalLaw Quarterly
who accepted the task of publishing the transcript with an outlook on publishing future transcripts in the series. By carrying this responsibility, the editors have opened a law review to
new possibilities for sharing critical information to a wide audience. Finally, we thank Justice
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his time. Born in a small town in Mississippi, Jefferson's family moved
west-first to Denver and then to Los Angeles. He confronted racial

prejudice throughout these early years, including an incident in which
his high school counselors discouraged him from going to college. Despite these early obstacles, Jefferson attended the University of California, Los Angeles, and eventually Harvard Law School. Following his
graduation from Harvard in 1934, Jefferson accomplished a wide range
of pursuits within the legal profession. From 1934 until 1946, he taught
law at Howard University in Washington, D.C. During World War II,
he served in the federal government as Assistant General Counsel for the
Office of Price Administration. From 1946 until 1959, he engaged in general law practice in Los Angeles.
In 1959, Jefferson reluctantly accepted appointment by Governor
Edmund G. Brown, Sr. to the municipal court. The next year Governor
Brown elevated him to the superior court. Jefferson capped his judicial
career in 1975 when Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. appointed him to
the court of appeal. Justice Jefferson also served briefly as a justice pro
tern of the California Supreme Court. From just one week of hearings,
he participated in decisions written over a two year period. Jefferson
wrote several crucial opinions and gained direct insight into the character of Supreme Court justices and the political forces they confront.
While serving as a jurist, he issued several decisions establishing new
law in several fields. One such decision was Greater Westchester Homeowners Association v. City of Los Angeles,1 which held the city liable for
emotional distress that neighboring residents suffered from airport noise.
In Drummond v. General Motors Corp.,' he rendered a controversial
opinion on manufacturers' liability for defectively designed products. In
Serrano v. Priest,3 he challenged methods for funding public schools.
Many of his decisions, issued at the trial level, were affirmed by higher
Bernard S. Jefferson for consenting to the interview and for patiently working with us to preserve his important perspectives on the evolution of California legal history.
THE COMMITTEE ON HISTORY OF LAW IN CALIFORNIA
Laurene Wu McClain, Chair, 1986-1987
Kenneth D. Crews, Chair, 1985-1986
Christian G. Fritz, Chair, 1984-1985
1. 26 Cal. 3d 86, 603 P.2d 1329, 160 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820
(1980). See also infra text accompanying notes 23-25.
2. No. 771-098 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County July 29, 1966). See also infra text accompanying note 22.
3. 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Clowes
v. Serrano, 432 U.S. 907 (1977). See Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 315 (1977) (upholding attorney fee award based on a "private attorney general" rationale); see also infra text accompanying notes 49-51.
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courts and became landmark rulings. Yet, Justice Jefferson may be best
known among practicing attorneys as the author of the CaliforniaEvidence Benchbook.4 Now in its second edition, the text is a standard treatise for California lawyers.
One of the most interesting and unusual episodes in Jefferson's career was the controversy surrounding his appointment as presiding justice of Division One for the Court of Appeal, Second District, in 1979.
Taking advantage of the temporary absence from California of Democratic Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., the Republican Lieutenant
Governor Mike Curb named Superior Court Judge Armand Arabian to
the vacant presiding justice position. Upon Governor Brown's return to
the state, he named Jefferson as his choice for the post. The California
Supreme Court resolved the conflict by endorsing the Lieutenant Governor's authority during the Governor's absence from the state, but also
recognizing the Governor's power to withdraw and replace a nomination
pending before the Commission on Judicial Appointments.5
In 1980, Jefferson joined the faculty of the University of West Los
Angeles School of Law, and in 1982, he became president of that institution. Justice Jefferson remains an active jurist by special appointment to
certain cases, and he lectures frequently on evidence and other legal
subjects.
I.

Family Background, Childhood, and
Reflections on Education

Doyle: Justice Jefferson, can you describe your immediate family?
Jefferson: My immediate family consists of my wife, Betty, and two children-a son, Roland, and a daughter, Cassandra. My son, a psychiatrist,
is married and has four children. My daughter is not married.
I also have two brothers and a sister. There were four children and
they're all alive. One brother, Edwin, is a retired justice of the court of
appeal who was a judge on the municipal court, superior court, and the
court of appeal in all for thirty-two years before retirement. I have a
brother, Ronald, who lives in Chicago. He is a pediatrician. I have a
sister, Ruby, who lives here in Los Angeles who is a retired elementary
school teacher. My mother and father are both now deceased.
Doyle: Could you describe when you were born, your parents, and your
ancestry?
4. B. JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE BENCHBOOK (2d ed. 1982). See also infra
p. 258.
5. In re Governorship, 26 Cal. 3d 110, 603 P.2d 1357, 160 Cal. Rptr. 760 (1979).
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Winter

Jefferson: I was born in Mississippi, in a little town called Coffeeville. I
don't think it's on the map anymore, if it ever happened to be on the
map. But it was somewhere between Jackson, Mississippi, the capital,
which was in the southern part going from there up north; maybe it was
somewhere in the middle of the state. It was just a little town called
Coffeeville and I have some recollections of it. From living there my
folks moved to another place in Mississippi called Holly Springs. Holly
Springs is a town which was in the northern part of Mississippi because it
was about sixty miles from Memphis, Tennessee.
My father was a carpenter, probably with a fourth or fifth grade
education. My mother, however, had gone to what was called normal
school. I would suppose it would be equated with high school or a little
bit better. She taught in the local elementary school and actually she was
my first teacher in Coffeeville. My dad, being a carpenter and from a
little town, his life was spent in traveling all around the state working for
various construction companies.
The move to Holly Springs was basically to try to better the educational opportunities. Coffeeville had nothing to offer except in the sense
of the separate black school with probably one teacher or two; I have
very little recollection of Coffeeville. In Holly Springs, however, there
was a school called Rust College, founded, I think, by the Methodists.
Most of the teachers were white. In other words, you might say they
were missionaries who went into the South in such a school in an effort
to give some educational background to the blacks. And although it was
called a college, it had an elementary school so I actually went to college
as a youngster so to speak. But I have fond recollections of Rust College
and taking piano, for example, from a music teacher at the college. All
in all, it was an interesting experience although we didn't stay there too
long.
Doyle: Where did you go after Mississippi?
Jefferson: We moved from Holly Springs to Denver. You might be interested in why we moved. After my dad had moved around so much, he
and my mother decided to settle down where he could be home more.
My father was inclined to say, "Well, why don't we buy a farm and stay
here in Mississippi." But the story goes that my mother said, "No, these
four children of ours are not going to get any education in Mississippi, so
we better move on elsewhere." My father had some friends who had
gone to Denver from Mississippi, and he wrote [them], and they wrote
back and said, "Why don't you come to Denver?" In the meantime, he
also had some friends who had come out to Los Angeles. So the decision
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was made to go to Denver. That would have been about 1919, I suppose,
so in other words, I would have been about nine years of age.
We moved to Denver, and lo and behold, he discovered that Denver, because of its cold climate, all of its houses are brick and there isn't
that much work for a carpenter. So that was kind of a disastrous experience for two years in Denver because the work was scarce. Then he
wrote to his friends in Los Angeles and they said, "There's plenty of
carpentry work out here because the houses are frame stucco, so that
means that even the stucco houses allow carpentry work." We then
came to Los Angeles. It would have been about 1921.
Doyle: Do you have any recollection of your early childhood experiences
in Mississippi or Denver?
Jefferson: Mainly, in Mississippi. It's where I first came into contact
with the unpleasantness of racial prejudice. As a youngster, I remember
having to get off the sidewalk because that's what I was told to do when a
white couple would be coming down the street. And I remember some
experiences of white youngsters chasing me home from school. Those
were, you might say, the real bad-tasting experiences of racial prejudice.
And I can remember, for example, in going to school, I went down a
street and there was a very crippled young white boy who would be
there, and he would throw out his crutch in an effort to strike me. And,
of course, I always dodged [it]; I wasn't about to get into any fight with
anybody. But those were the kind of things I remember, especially in
Coffeeville. I don't seem to remember too much about what happened in
Holly Springs of that nature.
The same segregated pattern of life was in Denver, though. I remember they had a community swimming pool inside because of the cold
weather. Well, they set aside days, such as on Thursdays, when blacks
could go into the city's swimming pool and gym. I always worked,
maybe all of us did to try to help out the family, so I remember selling
the newspaper called the Denver Post and getting used to that cold
weather-my hands, fingers, feeling like they were going to freeze off
because the weather was so cold. But I enjoyed the experience of working, even as a youngster doing that. I recollect that I would have gone to
elementary school for two years in Denver. I don't have too much recollection of it. There was no segregation so far as the school was concerned. You went to the neighborhood school although most blacks, of
course, lived in a particular section of the city. But I had no unpleasant
experiences at all as far as the school was concerned.
Doyle: What was Los Angeles like in the 1920's when you arrived?
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Jefferson: It was a small community and I would say with a population
well under a million. About five high schools in those days made up the
city school system. Junior highs were just about beginning because I
ended up going to Manual Arts High School, which was one of the five.
I guess I went in 1924 because I came out in 1927. And, of course, in
those days, there were not too many cars. The street car was the mode of
transportation. If you were going into other communities such as Long
Beach they used to have what they called the Red Car Line run by
Southern Pacific, still in effect a streetcar.
But Los Angeles in those days was still a segregated community in
the sense that most of the blacks lived in the east side of the city, a few
on the west side. My folks settled on the west side. But there was not
discrimination in the sense that you could go to a theater and sit anywhere you wanted to. You could go to restaurants, but the restaurant
owners in those days had quite a system. The black couple came in; they
would generally be seated near the kitchen. In other words they had an
area there. They wouldn't say so, but anybody who was black knew exactly why you were being seated there. So that was the system.
They did some gerrymandering of the school system. For example,
we lived within walking distance of Manual Arts High School. Most of
the blacks went to Jefferson High which is way on the east side, and I
would say that probably Jefferson High in those days would be sixty percent white and forty percent black. At Manual, where I went, there was
only a handful of blacks. If we had a graduating class of 500, there
wouldn't have been over five or six blacks. Both of my brothers had gone
to Manual, but when I got ready to go, they had done some gerrymandering, and I was supposed to go to Jefferson-which meant taking the
streetcar, a thirty minute ride across town. My mother had to get a special permit in order for me to go to Manual, telling them of course, "He's
had two brothers go there and he's within walking distance," and so we
got the permit and so I went to Manual. There were a few blacks who
attended some of the other schools, but just a handful.
Doyle: What experiences do you remember from going to Manual Arts
High School in Los Angeles?
Jefferson: I have told this many times. When I went to register, the vice
principal was the counselor for the students-they didn't have special
counselors. So he asked, "What kind of course do you want to take?" I
said I wanted to take college preparatory. And he said, "You ought not
to take that. You ought to take a shop course; your people won't do well
trying to go to college." His name was C.P. Fonda; I've never forgotten
it. So I said, "Mr. Fonda, I'm going to take the college preparatory
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course. I'll be here four years and I'll come back in four years and I want
you to note when I come back as to where I stand in the class." Well, I
was a top student in my class so I had the chance to go back and tell him.
I said, "You may not remember, but four years ago when I started, you
told me my people did not do well; therefore, you advised against going
into a college preparatory program. Now that I'm the valedictorian of
the class I hope that you won't give that advice to any other blacks." So
he said, "Well, I apologize and I'm happy to see you've done so well."
That's a vivid recollection of the attitude of the school administrators in
those days.
But my own experience at Manual was a very enjoyable one
although we only had a handful of blacks. I belonged to the Debating
Club and the Oratorical Society, was the Commencement speaker, belonged to the Chess Club, belonged to the ROTC Band, [and] played in
the orchestra. In other words, I had good participation from the standpoint of extra-curricular activities. There was no prejudice shown in that
regard.
Doyle: Did you find that the educational philosophy where blacks were
being sent to certain areas changed as time went by.
Jefferson: It took a long time and it hadn't changed by the time my own
children came along. My son, for example, went to Los Angeles High,
because we had moved, and we were closer to Los Angeles High. I had
to go over to talk with the counselors, and the counselors said, "Well,
you know your son ought not to be thinking about college. He should go
into some field of shop work or other activity." And I said, "Is this the
kind of advice you've been giving other blacks, too?" So we had quite a
heated run-in. I never did get back to point out what happened to him.
He went on to U.S.C. [University of Southern California], majored in
Anthropology, went on to medicine, and then took the work to become a
psychiatrist. But that [type of discrimination] was still going on.
I remember back in those days I was working for the Urban League
and I can't recall the details, but the school board had a session in which
I had to make the point there that I thought the school board ought to
look into what the counselors were doing in the various schools. I felt
very strongly that they were doing exactly what they had been doing for
years, which was trying to shunt all blacks over to nonacademic work.
But I think that philosophy has changed, at least I hope so, but I haven't
been in touch with it in recent years.
Doyle: Where did you go to college and what type of experience did you
have there?
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Jefferson: I went to U.C.L.A. [University of California, Los Angeles].
At that time it was on Vermont Avenue, not in Westwood where it is
now; it was called Southern Branch. But after two years there, it moved
to Westwood. The time spent at U.C.L.A. was equally as enjoyable as
my high school experience. I majored in Political Science and minored
in Economics. In those days U.C.L.A. did not have any graduate programs: it was strictly a bachelor's program. But they had, of course,
large classes and I became what they called a reader, a grader that assisted the instructors in the big classes. Again, I participated in the extra-curricular activities, was on the Debating Team, in oratorical
contests, and the school band. I was fortunate enough to be elected to
Phi Beta Kappa in my junior year and was picked as one of the three
candidates from U.C.L.A. in an effort to get a Rhodes Scholarship. But I
knew I wasn't going to get anywhere with that because I didn't have the
athletic background at all. As a matter of fact, I decided that maybe if I
could get some athletics somewhere, I would have a better chance to get
a Rhodes Scholarship. So I went out for track, but the track coach soon
realized that I had no business being there. He put me in a two mile and
I came in last, and then I hung up the spikes and decided that athletics
was not for me. I suppose in those days I weighed only about 115
pounds and was five feet, nine and one-half inches tall, so you can see I
was simply a beanpole. I really had no interest in athletics anyway and I
only tried that to see whether it would push my chances, but it didn't.
Doyle: Do you think that athletics are overly emphasized in school today, especially in the black community?
Jefferson: Yes, I would think so, and, of course, there's a reason for it.
It's because of the development in professional athletics that has given
blacks with ability, that is, with athletic ability, an opportunity to become secure and earn money that otherwise they could never earn. I
think part of that is the American concept of paying, to me, a much
greater deference and worship to those with athletic ability, and [to] the
movie people, so that the blacks who are able to get in there have been
able to earn salaries which they would have no possibility of earning
otherwise.
I think that's a fault of the American society. For example, the pay
for school teachers-they've got to go through and get a college degreeit might be only twelve, fourteen, or fifteen thousand a year; now maybe
it's higher. For example, Chicago's school teachers' strike has just ended
and I have been told that their salaries were in the area of $15,000. And
those are people who've gotten the B.A. degree and maybe beyond. So
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that's what we think of education. That's what we're willing to pay our

money to support.
I heard the other day the criticism, I guess, of the American Medical Association recommending that boxing be terminated because of the

danger to people engaged in it, because of what has happened to some of
our boxers. And yet, some have said, granting it's a dangerous sport, it

gives some minorities an opportunity to achieve something that they
could never achieve otherwise. They might be a janitor or they might be
practically nothing, but at least boxing gives them a chance, so why
should they be denied that opportunity.

Getting back to the original question, yes, I think we overemphasize
athletics. But as long as the American public wants to worship athletics,
and to pay out the money that would permit people in athletics to make

decent salaries, then I suppose any parent who has a child, say a black
parent who has a child who has any athletic ability, is going to push that
because it will at least offer a good opportunity for a good earning capacity. Now, probably on the overall basis, there are many that go for it and
don't make it. But at least as long as a certain number are going to get

these phenomenal salaries, then we're going to have parents pushing
their children into athletics. Putting a football, a basketball into their
hands before they can walk, even, in the hopes that maybe they'll become
a star.
Doyle: As an experienced educator, do you think the educational system
today is failing to provide students with an adequate education?
Jefferson: That's a tough question to answer. The inability to recognize
the school teachers and pay them decent salaries means that the educational system is not drawing the high quality of teachers that ought to be
drawn. It seems to me that, on the whole, our school systems are left
with not having the choice of picking those who have the greatest capacity to be good teachers. With the business world offering what it offers,
the question could be asked, "Why would one want to go into teaching?"
And then of course, we have a problem-I'm looking at it from a
racial standpoint-of what has happened in the neighborhood school
which is a part of the pattern of segregated living. The school boards will
not put most of the money where it ought to go for the minority schools
where there isn't the backing of parents, because of the financial situations of black parents generally. But, for example, to say that in a school
system you must have a schoolroom of thirty to thirty-five students, well
that's fine where you have a neighborhood where there's a lot of backing
at home, but to put thirty students who come from minority homes in a
schoolroom, and you don't have the very best teachers there, and parents
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lend very little support, then that child is not going to receive much of an
education.
Then we have a whole system of requiring that students be graduated at a certain age, with the result that you have students going into
college who cannot read, graduating from high school and they can't
read, can't spell, and the colleges do the same thing. I see students in law
school who cannot spell and who cannot write a decent paragraph. I
think maybe some of it also is that we have encouraged moving away
from the basics. I don't know whether television or radio has anything
to do with it; but somehow, in elementary schools and in high schools,
there is not a strong emphasis on reading, writing, and arithmetic, so to
speak.
I think back to the days when I was in high school and had to write
papers in almost every subject. We had to go to the library and study.
Grammar was important and taught, and I think we've gotten away from
that. Everything now seems to me to be looking towards training persons in what they might do, whether it is nursing, secretarial work, or
what have you. And I just think that the school systems are simply failing when they somehow are graduating people without the basic skills in
English, writing, and arithmetic. Maybe now you punch a computer or
punch the adding machine, and you don't need to know how to add by
hand.
I think there's an answer to all this. We need to improve the salaries
and working conditions in teaching and then there needs to be a better
distribution of funds so that people who need superior teaching ought to
have it. But what school district, for example, is going to say, "Well,
we'll put enough money so [that] if we're in a neighborhood where the
children need to be limited to fifteen to a class, we'll have enough teachers so that that's all they'll be teaching." I don't know of any school
district throughout the state that would be that enlightened.
II.
A.

Legal Education, Teaching, and Practicing Law

Studying Law at Harvard Law School

Doyle: Why did you choose to go to Harvard Law School?
Jefferson: Well, let me tell you why I even decided to go into law. As I
was going through high school and then got into college, I had the idea I
wanted to be a teacher. But then I studied the Los Angeles School District. I was thinking that there were no black high school teachers in any
of the high schools, few elementary. I think we had one elementary
school principal. Then I got to thinking, suppose I go into college teaching. I felt if I did that I'd have to go south and teach in the all-black
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colleges. I still wouldn't get a chance to teach at U.C.L.A. or U.S.C. or
any of those schools.
By that time my brother decided to go into law and he went to
U.S.C., so I said, "Well, I'll have to give up my idea of teaching. I'll
study law and at least be my own boss. Whether I make any money or
not, nobody will be telling me 'You don't have a job' or 'You can't work
here.'" Once I'd decided I would go into law, I said, "I'm going to pick
the law school that I think is the best in the country." There were, at
that time, two black lawyers in Los Angeles who were from Harvard.
You might say the old timers. I don't know when they graduated but
they were good lawyers: Willis O'Tyler and Hugh McBeth. I had seen
them perform, and I said, "Well, I'm going to Harvard." So that's how I
happened to go.
Doyle: What was Harvard like?
Jefferson: To me, it was a wonderful experience because in those days
the giants of legal writing and legal teaching were at Harvard. So I studied under [Samuel] Williston who wrote a treatise on contracts, 6 [Austin] Scott who wrote a treatise on trusts, 7 and various [people] like that.
In those days, the students really revered those scholars. That was just
the whole attitude; you had reverence for that brightness of mind. And
yet, Harvard still is and was then, a big school. We must have had something like 600-700 in our first year class. But they frankly told you-they
didn't have LSAT in those days-if you had a bachelor's degree from a
fairly decent school, then you could get in.
I'll always remember just about the first time they got the whole
class together, the dean said, "We have the open door policy at Harvard.
Experience tells us, look to the man to your left, look to the man to your
right, and see the door there; at the end of the first year one of you three
will go out that door, not to return." Now of course, those were the days
when all of those schools didn't allow women, so my whole class was
nothing but men, 650 males. Again, there were two blacks out of that
class; one was Asian-American.
We had our fiftieth reunion last year, and it was interesting to see
that when you walk through the campus you saw about fifty percent females, well, maybe not quite that high, but to show you the difference.
Yale was the same way, and they've all now changed. Law was practically all male back in those days.
Just to have studied under those scholars was to me an experience I
could never forget. But, by the same token, I'll tell this little anecdote, if
6. S. WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS (1st ed. 1920).
7. A. ScoTr, LAW OF TRUSTS (1st ed. 1939).
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you want to call it that, that happened back at our reunion. The dean
was talking about what was happening now in the law school-that everybody was striving to be on the top in the first year, because that's when
the big law firms would begin to pick their people, and that if one got
picked, he didn't have to worry too much about what happened thereafter; you know he could kind of slide through. So, they had several of us
talk about our experiences the first year at Harvard. I stated that I did
not have that problem of being at the top in the first year in order to try
to be placed in a good law firm in New York or Philadelphia, or what
have you, because I knew it didn't make a bit of difference. I could graduate number one and I still wouldn't be considered. So while all of my
classmates may have been struggling to see where they were going to go
as to a clerkship, I just went merrily along, studying law, enjoying it,
trying to do the best I could, but without having the worry of whether I
was going to go to a big law firm as a clerk. Everybody at the reunion
got a big kick out of that story.
B. Teaching at Howard University and Working as a Government
Attorney During the 1930's and 1940's
Doyle: After leaving Harvard, did you go into education?
Jefferson: Yes, [although] I had no intentions of doing it as a career. I
planned when I graduated to return to Los Angeles and practice law, but
there was a teacher from Howard University School of Law in Washington, D.C. who was getting his doctorate degree while I was getting my
law degree, bachelor's in law in those days. He talked with me and said
that the dean of Howard Law School was upgrading Howard Law
School into a first rate law school because it was the only school that
many southern blacks could go to, because they couldn't go to the state
law schools. What the southern states would do was give blacks scholarships and send them up to Howard, out of state. So he said he received a
letter from the dean at Howard who asked him if there were any black
graduating seniors who might want to come down and teach a year because the dean wanted to send off another teacher to do graduate work.
And so he said, "Would you be interested?" I said, "Oh, I don't know, I
might, I'd have to talk with him." So, one day the dean from Howard
came up and talked with me about what my plans were. I said, "Well,
I'm going back to Los Angeles, I'll take the bar in August." That's when
they gave it, and I was planning to practice. So he said, "Well, if you
take it in August, when will you hear?" I said, "Oh, around December."
So he said, "Well, I'd like to have you come and teach a year if you
would." So I said I'd think about it. I thought about it and said for a
certain amount of time I won't be doing anything anyway-I was wait-
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ing for the bar results-so I said, "Okay, I'll come down and teach."
And he said, "Well, do you still plan to go and take the bar?" I said,
"Yeah." So he said, "Gee, I wish you wouldn't do that because if you're
going to teach, suppose you don't pass it." I said, "Well, that's the gamble you'll have to take because I'm not going to wait; I feel that I know
more now generally in law than I will at any other time, so you'll just
have to take that chance if you want me to teach." So he said, "Okay, go
ahead then." So I took it and passed it and I was there teaching when
the results came out in December. So that's how I happened to go to
Howard and teach there at the law school.
Howard Law School had gotten approval-A.B.A. approval-and
belonged to the American Association of Law Schools. The dean's name
was Charles Houston. He was the one who really organized the NAACP
Defense Fund that took on cases like Brown v. Board of Education.'
That was an interesting experience when I was at Howard, because
Thurgood Marshall, who later went on to the Supreme Court, graduated
from Howard in 1934, which is the same year I graduated from Harvard.
I met him because he was still working there in Washington, and I got to
know him. They had assembled a small core of teachers, about five, fulltime at Howard, and one of their main interests, you might say, was to
figure out a way to attack the segregated system. A lot of time was spent
in research and developing the theories of how to break down the legal
backing of segregation and all of its aspects. I think I'm right, it was one
of the first schools that organized a course called Civil Rights. And that
was one of the interesting aspects of being a teacher at Howard.
Once I got there, I decided I was going to stay in teaching initially.
So I took a sabbatical leave in 1941 and went back to Harvard to get my
doctor degree in law. That's when World War II broke out, while I was
there. And, of course, the law school just fell apart. There weren't many
students to begin with-the whole student body was about seventy-five,
about twenty-five to a class. They switched from a day to a night [program] and some of the teachers I had known when I was working on my
doctorate came down to Washington and went into the governmental
service, so they asked me, "Why don't you come on and join us and work
as a government attorney." So I did that and was with the Office of Price
Administration as an assistant general counsel.
Doyle: When you were at Howard, what was Washington, D.C. like?
Jefferson: Washington, D.C. was an exciting place in the sense that it
was the seat of the government. But it was, as it was located in the
South, as segregated a system as you'd find. The school systems were
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also infra notes 39, 45 & 60 and accompanying text.
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completely separate; black system of administration all the way downblack teachers in elementary school to high school-all black. A separate white system. Blacks could ride on the street cars, you didn't have to
sit in back. However, blacks couldn't go to movies, you had to have
separate black movie houses. Blacks couldn't go to restaurants. So it was
just a complete segregated system.
Doyle: What was Thurgood Marshall like in his youth?
Jefferson: I don't remember too much now. I kept in some contact with
him, but you see, he had been schooled under the developing group fighting for civil rights. Now the teacher who was up at Harvard getting his
graduate degree when I was there was William Hastie. He went back to
Howard and became the dean but then he ended up being appointed the
first black circuit court judge. He stumped for [Harry] Truman. And
when Truman got elected, he put him on, I think, the court of appeals in
the Philadelphia area; I don't remember what circuit he was on. He was
the one who had taught Thurgood Marshall, and so they grew up with
the view that there has to be a way to legally attack the segregated
system.
Talking about that at Howard, we used to talk about the so-called
restrictive covenants. Of course, when we moved to Los Angeles, my
people moved in an area on the west side; we didn't think about that. It
was just a little frame house, but it had a restrictive covenant. So here
comes a law suit to evict us and this lawyer I was telling you about,
Willis O'Tyler, 9 represented my parents-I don't know whether there
were any others or not-but he won that lawsuit on the ground that the
restrictive covenant provided that it should not be effective unless all of
the homeowners agreed. It just happened that there was one homeowner
that had not agreed. So he was able to knock it out on the ground that it
never became effective, but there were many restrictive covenants that
were effective. It was illegal to sell, and it was illegal to buy, from the
standpoint of any nonwhite. Blacks went into the courts and the courts
would enforce the covenant. The courts did not consider their decisions
to be state action. The courts said that they were not enforcing segregated neighborhoods; they were merely enforcing a private contract, and
a private contract doesn't constitute state action. So what we used to
talk about was how we could get the courts to see that the courts' action
wasn't different from a city council passing an ordinance saying that all
blacks can't live in a certain area of the city. The city council's action is
state action without any question. Well, when the courts step in and
enforce something, is that not state action?
9. See supra p. 236.
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But, of course, as long as you had the mood of the country in a
conservative attitude, we didn't get anywhere with it, but ultimately the
whole theory and concept of what constitutes state action began to expand. So that at some point, finally, the courts said, yes, whenever the
court enforces even a private contract, that's state action."0 Therefore, if
the contract is one which if enacted by a legislature or city council would
violate the Fourteenth Amendment, then the court's approval of a private contract would also violate the Fourteenth Amendment. But there
were things like that that the teachers at Howard talked about and tried
to figure ways to get courts to expand their concept of the Constitution.
Doyle: Do you have any experiences you remember from working in the
Office of Price Administration during World War II-it must have been
somewhat strange to have a black attorney as counsel for a governmental
agency in those days.
Jefferson: Yes, it was kind of unique except that once the war got under
way, the war agencies, like the Office of Price Administration, did begin
to hire a few black attorneys, whereas the old line agencies did not, such
as Agriculture, for example. We were dealing with the matter of passing
regulations and writing regulations that dealt with price control. We had
what we called regional offices like most federal governmental agencies.
There was a regional office in Dallas, one out here in Los Angeles, and
also one in San Francisco.
One day the head of the division in Dallas wanted to see me about a
regulation or some matter. One of my colleagues had suggested to him
that the best time to see me was in the executive lunchroom, so that we
could discuss business over lunch. The Dallas lawyer said, "Is that the
only way I could see him?" And my colleague said, "Well, what's wrong
with that?" The Dallas lawyer said, "Look, I'm from the South and I
understand that Jefferson is black and I've never sat at a table eating a
meal with a black." So my friend said, "Well, look, if you want an answer to your question, you have to get it from him. There's only one way
you can get it; you're going to have your first experience of sitting down
and eating with a black." Well, of course, the next day the Dallas lawyer
and I had lunch and nothing happened. I was immune because I didn't
ever let on that I knew what had gone on before. I just had a hunch that
there were a lot of them who, you might say, were from the South and
who had that kind of experience and prejudice and yet who overcame it.
On the other hand, you know it's differen[t] in individuals. When I
was doing graduate work, there was a chap from Oklahoma, a white
10. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 254
(1953).
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fellow, who was getting a master's [degree] and we became close friends.
He and his wife were there and invited us over to dinner in his apartment
just as if nothing had happened. I frequently thought-suppose we had
transferred and all this was going on in Oklahoma City. He might have
felt he couldn't have carried on that personal relationship.
We know now that in the South how it's changed so that once the
barriers start breaking down, people will come to see that maybe we're
all human and there are good and bad in all of us.
C. Practicing Law in Los Angeles After World War H
Doyle: After working as counsel for the Price Administration, what did
you decide to do after the war was over?
Jefferson: I decided to return to Los Angeles to practice law. I had
thought about going back into teaching, but somehow after I had
stopped and worked for the government for several years, I decided I
would go back and get into the private practice of law.
Doyle: What was Los Angeles like following World War II?
Jefferson: Well, it was beginning to grow with the shipbuilding and the
other industries that developed in California, and the many soldiers from
the East passing through. So it began to grow at an astronomical pace
more or less. And perhaps it suffered growing pains, but there seemed to
be a lot more activity. It was getting out of being a good old country
town sprawled out and was beginning to really develop something not
necessarily unique, but an attempt to have uniqueness.
Doyle: Were minorities better off in Los Angeles after the war than
before?
Jefferson: It was still in the '50's and there still were problems of employment. I had decided to work for the Los Angeles Urban League as a
volunteer, and I thought we had a pretty good organization. One of the
reasons I started working with them was because I could see deficiences
in employment. For example, there were no teachers as such, there were
no black clerks in the department stores, blacks were not hired to drive
the buses or streetcars, and you had an interesting phenomenon that the
federal government in terms of the Post Office Department hired many,
many blacks, and we used to say that there were more Ph.D.'s and
M.A.'s among blacks working in the post office than anyplace else. And
the reason was simply that although they were educated, received those
degrees, they couldn't get jobs. I remember when we went to the department stores as an Urban League and said, "Why don't you have black
clerks?" The answer, almost universally, by each department store, such
as Bullocks, May Company, Broadway, was: "Well, we wouldn't have
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any objections but we think our customers won't go for that. That they
just won't buy." Or one would say, "We'll do it if one of the others will."
But somehow we kept working on it and finally the department stores
did proceed to hire blacks and in the same way we finally persuaded the
Rapid Transit District to start hiring blacks, and in that way employment began to pick up.
Doyle: How did the Urban League differ from the NAACP?
Jefferson: Well, I would say that the NAACP-the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People-was an organization
which would get involved in law suits. So their main thrust would be to
change things through a lawsuit, whereas the Urban League worked in
terms of what I would call a mediation. In other words, they would seek
to persuade industry that it was in the best interest of industry to adopt a
policy of fair employment practices. That was the way the Urban
League worked. Of course, it had on its board a large number of members of all races who felt that by working together you could get some
advancement. At times, if you wanted to give it a description, people
would say that the NAACP was the War Department and the Urban
League was the State Department.
Doyle: How long were you in private practice and what type of law did
you practice when you came back to Los Angeles?
Jefferson: I was in practice for about ten years, and I was more or less a
sole practitioner, engaged in general practice, handling some probate,
some administrative law work, some personal injury, some criminal
cases-just a little bit of everything. In my opinion, that really equipped
me for the bench in a pretty good fashion, by having had the experience
in just about all the various fields of law.
Doyle: What was the practice of law like for black attorneys in the
1940's and 1950's?
Jefferson: I would say it was rather limited and we saw the effect of the
whole segregated system. For example, the black attorneys had to compete for clients not only with other black attorneys but [with] white [lawyers], Jewish lawyers, Italian [lawyers]; and part of that was the result of
a feeling among the black population that since the court system was
pretty much white-the judge was white, the juries would be white-if
they were going to win a case or succeed, they'd better have a white
lawyer rather than a black lawyer. So in I would say most cases, if a
black lawyer is on one side, it would seldom happen that another black
lawyer would be on the other side. Although I suppose in the divorce
actions you might have two black attorneys, one representing the wife
and one representing the husband, but generally speaking there was that
feeling. And of course, black lawyers would complain with each other
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about why is it we are not only faced with competition for business
among our own, but with everybody else?
Then there was a feeling-and I think it was borne out-that many
of the judges felt that black lawyers were not deserving of the same treatment. I'm now referring to fees. If you were in probate, there was the
feeling that the judges would award the black attorneys a lesser sum than
they would a white attorney handling the same type of case. I think as I
recall, committees talked to the presiding judges in Los Angeles County
about that in an effort to change it, and I think it might have had some
effect.
Doyle: What was the reaction and attitude of the judiciary and the court
system toward black attorneys in general?
Jefferson: I would say that there was this feeling of prejudice somewhat.
I got the impression that in many instances the judges felt that, well,
maybe the black lawyers were not as well-equipped as the others and
didn't deserve the same amount of respect. That wouldn't be true of all
judges, obviously, but I think it was true of some. Then on the other
hand, in the criminal field, when a black defendant charged with murder
would be represented by a black attorney, this was the one situation
perhaps where the party in the system felt he was going to get a better
break. It was my own personal feeling that there were some judges that
took the attitude that, "Well, here's a black who's killed [a] black; it
doesn't make any difference, so let's give the defense lawyer a break and
instead of first degree murder, let the defendant off the hook or give him
a lower sentence." That seemed to happen with some of the judges and it
was a very unfortunate thing. I feel that it had to be overcome, and I
think with the change in the judiciary and newer judges coming in, that
that attitude did change. In the black community it certainly was a terrible feeling by people that as long as one black killed another, then it
didn't make any difference; therefore, the defendant ought not necessarily be punished as severely as if it's an interracial killing.
Doyle: What was the attitude of the bar associations towards minority
attorneys during the 1940's and 1950's?
Jefferson: Well, to me that's a black mark against the bar of this country. The Los Angeles Bar had a provision in its constitution that refused
to admit black attorneys. The A.B.A. was the same way. The blacks, of
course, had to form their own bar associations. In Los Angeles, for example, we had the Langston Bar Association and that name is from a
black lawyer well past the Civil War days who had made quite a reputation in the East. But that was quite removed from the Los Angeles
County Bar. I don't remember the year, but it was a struggle because the
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bar association was similar to other private groups who wanted to preserve their organization in terms of being simply a private group, and for
a while they simply would not consider that even though it's a private
organization, it's really a public group, in a sense, made up of lawyers.
Perhaps the general thinking was at one time that the bar was being entirely too elitist in its thinking. Over the years I know that many lawyers
not belonging to the large firms felt that the whole bar, the State Bar, was
controlled by a few big firms who were not interested in giving representation to minorities or those from smaller firms. It's only been in recent
years that I think this idea has been attacked with some success so that
you now do have on the State Bar a Board of Governors with lawyers
from smaller firms and individual practitioners. At one time, the personal injury lawyer didn't have a chance of becoming a member of the
Board of Governors, because that was looked down upon by the big firms
who were engaged primarily in commercial and corporate practice.
That's changing and has changed.
Doyle: So you would not agree with Justice [William] Douglas who
wouldn't have anything to do with bar associations during his time?
Jefferson: Well, I wasn't aware of what Justice Douglas' attitude was,
but, of course, there are those, a number of prominent whites I would
say, who refused to take part in bar activities, refused to belong to the
Los Angeles County Bar, for example, because of its racist policies. But
to me, one gains more if you can get on the inside and fight prejudice
once you're on the inside rather than taking a standoffish attitude, and
so I was glad to be able to join the American Bar Association and the
Los Angeles County Bar. I haven't been as active as I would like because
I've done so many other things, but still in my way of thinking, you
change attitudes if you get to talk with people and let them know face to
face what you think and how you feel. I think that has been the way that
some change in thinking on the part of leaders of the bar has taken place.
III. Appointments as Judge
Doyle: Justice Jefferson, could you explain why you decided to apply to
be a judge, and please trace your career as a judge from your appointment to the municipal court in 1960 to your retirement from the appellate court?
Jefferson: I wasn't expecting to be a judge at all and it was purely happenstance. In late 1959 1 got a telephone call from one of the black leaders of the community who was president of an insurance company. He
said, "What do you think about becoming a judge?" I said, "Well, I
haven't given it a thought. I don't think I can; my brother is already on
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the bench." So he said, "Well, I'll tell you what's happening." He said,
"Governor Pat Brown wants to make a black appointment before the end
of '59. And there are two political groups-one supporting one person
and one supporting another. The groups are at each other's throats." So
the Governor asked, "Well, can't you find somebody who is noncontroversial, who isn't involved in politics?" He said, "Yes, I know an individual, I'll talk with him about it." So, he reported back to the Governor
that I might be interested.
Then I got a call from the Governor one day, asking me to come to
his office to talk with him. When I talked with him, I said, "Yes, I would
be interested, but I would be interested only in a superior court appointment." I said, "I have too much background to be on the municipal
court. And I can't see myself trying traffic cases for the rest of my life."
So he said, "Well, I don't have a vacancy on the superior court. There is
one vacancy and I have promised it to someone." He said, "But I tell
you, I can't put it in writing, but this is what I will do. I would like to
have you take this appointment, and I promise that I will elevate you for
the first superior court vacancy. Now you'll have to trust me." So, I said,
"Well, let me think it over for a few days." So I talked it over with a lot
of people and said, "Well, do you think the Governor means what he
says?" The man who initially contacted me, said, "I believe he is sincere.
But, of course, it's a gamble that you will have to take." So I called the
Governor's office back and said, yes, with [the] understanding that he
would elevate me on the first vacancy, I would accept the municipal
court [appointment]. That was the latter part of December. I think on
about the fifteenth of January, I'd been able to clear things up enough to
take the oath.
I stayed on the municipal court until the middle of May. It was
about four months, and a judge, who was out of Los Angeles and the
superior court but sitting in Long Beach, named Joseph Maltby, died. So
the first thing that came into my mind was, "I wonder if the Governor's
going to carry out his promise?" I didn't call him, however; I said,
"Well I'll just wait and see." In a day or two a fellow named Bill Rosenthal, I think was his name, had been a legislator and had been appointed
to the municipal court after me, came by my chambers. He said, "I understand you're going to be elevated to the superior court." I said,
"Where did you get that information?" He said, "Well, I went to the
Governor and told him I wanted it, and the Governor said, 'No, I've
already promised it to Justice Jefferson and I'm going to give it to him.' "
So sure enough, the next day the Governor called and asked me to come
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by his office. He said, "Well, I made a promise to you and now I am
keeping it."
A lot of people wondered how in the world did you sit only four
months on the municipal court and get elevated so fast. I didn't say
anything until years later. I said, "Oh, I don't know." Well, that was
my experience getting to be a judge.
Doyle: How were you elevated to the court of appeal?
Jefferson: I was elevated to the court of appeal by Governor Jerry
Brown, the son of Pat Brown, and that came as a surprise again because
my brother then had been elevated to the appellate court so I didn't give
it a thought that two brothers would be named-especially two minority
members. But I got a call one day from the Governor's legal secretary
who said that the Governor was getting to make appointments to the
appellate court and that I ought to be among those considered. This was
Tony Klein, who was the Governor's legal affairs secretary at that time.
He said, "I'd like to make an appointment for you to come up and talk to
the Governor." And I said, "All right, make it; whatever date is okay."
He said, "He's interested in finding out who knows how to write. I know
you've got your Benchbook but what about a memorandum of opinions
as a trial judge?" I said, "Well, I've got every one that I ever wrote." So
he said, "Well, pick out some of the ones that you deem better and then
come on up and talk to the Governor."
So he made the appointment, and I came up here to Sacramento and
met with the Governor, and I guess we must've talked for about three
hours. It was close to noon, and we went to about three o'clock just
talking about general things, not particularly the bench but philosophy of
life in general. He said, "All right, I'll let you know within time. There
are several people I've got under consideration." I said, "Fine," and
back to Los Angeles I went.
I guess about a week went by and then I got a call from Chief Justice
Don Wright whom I knew, and he said, "Congratulations." I said, "For
what?" He said, "You've been appointed to the appellate court." I said,
"I have?" He said, "Oh, I guess I'm speaking out of turn but the Governor's office said." I said, "Well, I haven't heard anything from the Governor." So he said, "Well, okay, I won't say anything and don't you say
anything either until you get some official word." In a couple of days
here came the call through from the Governor's office. That's how I
went to the appellate court.
Doyle: What were your impressions of Jerry Brown and what do you
recall from that three hour conversation that you had with him?
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Jefferson: Well, pretty much he had expressed the kind of philosophy
that he became known for about his idea of government. One of the
things I remember he was saying, "Well, maybe our expectations are too
great and maybe it's time to curb back and slow down on our expectations of what life should be like, how we should be, the money we ought
to be making."
But we just roamed so far and wide that I don't have any particular
recollection now of all the things we did talk about. Probably the legal
system and what were its faults and how could they be improved. One of
the things he said, for example: "You know I'm interested in changing
the legal system, or at least changing the judiciary in the sense of putting
on more minorities and women. I think it's time and that's what I plan
to be doing." And that he did.
Doyle: What do you think of the changes that he made in the judiciary?
Jefferson: Well, I've had a lot of people approach me and say, for example, "Well, look, he's ruining the judiciary. He's not putting on the right
people." And I said, "Maybe you can point to a few who do not seem to
be well equipped, but as I see it, he is doing just as well in making appointments as any other Governor."
Now one thing that is happening that has not happened in the past,
lawyers are being appointed to the bench-minority and women-who
are younger and maybe the reason for that is that in recent years you
have been able to get the number of blacks out into the field as lawyers,
and the number of women, because of course you have the minimum five
years for a municipal court and ten years for superior court. [Governor
Brown,] there's no doubt, does not quite have the pool, in terms of wanting to appoint minorities and women, that would exist for males. But as
I see it, in terms of production I see no difference in the quality of judges.
They have less experience, but if you're interested also in the philosophy
of life, maybe it's better if we have some younger people. Maybe it's
better if we have some minorities rather than to have the tried and true
leaders of the bar appointed to the bench when they are about ready to
retire from practice. They've made their fortunes, now they want a soft
spot to retire on. I'm not sure that's a better system. If you can find and
tell me of an incompetent judge appointed by Brown, I'll tell you one
who was appointed by Reagan.
Doyle: Describe the time and nature of your service on the California
Supreme Court as a pro tem judge.
Jefferson: Well, I served as a pro tem judge in about eighteen cases.
Actually, I sat basically one week in which those eighteen cases were
heard. But the decisions were not rendered for a period maybe of two
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years; it took that long for all of them to be decided. A lot of people may
have thought that I was sitting pro tern for a full two years because of the
way that those cases came out here and there. But my recollection now
is my pro tern term occurred about when, I think, [Marshall] McComb
might have no longer been with the court. So the court was sitting in Los
Angeles, and the chief justice asked if I would sit and take part in about
eighteen cases.
IV.
A.

Exemplary Decisions in which Justice Jefferson Wrote the
Court Opinion, and Changes He Helped Effect
People v. Caudillo

Doyle: You authored an opinion while you were on the court, called
People v. Caudillo.11 Could you explain what that case was about and try
to explain the strong public reaction that came about due to that case?
Jefferson: People v. Caudillo was a case in which the defendant had been
tried and convicted of rape. And the law, as I recall it, at that time
provided that if in the process of committing a rape, a defendant commits
great bodily injury upon the victim, then that becomes a basis for an
enhanced sentence which makes a sentence greater than if it's a rape
without commission of great bodily injury. 12 And the issue that was
before the court was an interpretation of that statutory provision in the
Penal Code that says "great bodily injury." After the case was argued, I
think there were five that initially had taken the view that there was
doubt as to whether there was great bodily injury in this case. In other
words, the issue developed: does the very act of rape itself constitute
great bodily injury? I was assigned to write the opinion. When I say I
was assigned, the chief justice asked me, "Would you like to write the
opinion?" I said, "Yes." So what I did was to trace the history of the
legislation and that phraseology that's used in other Penal Code sections
to determine what was meant by great bodily injury. I was convinced
that the history of the legislation and the legislative intent was such that
great bodily injury required something more than the act of rape itself;
that there had to be some substantial physical injury to the individual,
and that was not true in this case.
Now, the way decisions are written and developed when a draft is
written, is that it's circulated to all of the justices and there may be suggestions of changes or there may not be, but at any rate there were five
11. 21 Cal. 3d 562, 580 P.2d 274, 146 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1978).
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 264 (West 1967), modified by CAL. PENAL
Supp. 1986).
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members of the court that agreed with my ultimate draft of the opinion,
and there were two who wrote dissenting opinions, not separately, I
think, together-I don't know if it was Clark or Richardson. I believe
Justice Richardson wrote the dissent and he had Justice Clark agreeing
with him on it. And then Chief Justice [Rose Bird] wrote a concurring
opinion. At the time that she submitted a draft of [her] concurring opinion, I told her, "Well, you don't have to do this if there are some things
you want to say that I have not said in [my draft] opinion, [and] you
agree with the result. I'd be only too happy to add it, and I think the rest
of the court will go along with it." But she said, "No." She thought she
wanted to write the concurring opinion. That she did.
Well, I guess the hue and cry that developed, I realized, was an
article written by a man by the name of Hirsch, I think-I don't know
his first name-in a magazine called New West.13 It was an attack upon
the chief justice because of her concurring opinion. What appeared to
me to be unfair was that if it had to be an attack that the opinion was
wrong, then it should have been against me because I wrote the opinion,
plus against the whole court, other than Clark and Richardson. But, no,
the article might have mentioned that I wrote the opinion, but the whole
article was against Rose Bird for her concurring opinion, and I don't
recall that she said too much more than that rape's an awful crime, but
still all the court can do is interpret legislation, and the legislation simply
did not permit a finding that the act of rape itself constituted great bodily
injury. And if the legislature wanted to change the law, then it was free
to do so. But to me it was just a case where a writer decided he was
going to use that vehicle to criticize her and at least from the article, I
didn't get the criticism at all. That's what a writer may do, of course. I
suppose even if she had not written a concurring opinion, if the writer
wanted to, he could have said, "Well, why did you concur in the opinion?
Why didn't you join in the dissent?" It's easy enough to criticize somebody if you want to do so. And I think that a lot of people made up their
mind they wanted to go after her and they used that vehicle of her concurring opinion to subject her, in my opinion, to unjust criticism.
B. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories
Doyle: You've been accused of being a "judicial activist" yourself on a
number of occasions and one that I'd like to recall to mind and have you
comment on is the case of Curlenderv. Bio-Science Laboratories.14 In the
opinion, you wrote:
13. J. Kirsh, Rose Bird and the Politicsof Rape, Naw WEsT, July 31, 1978, at 28.
14. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
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Despite the cool reception accorded such "wrongful-life" litigation, both parents and their children have continued to seek redress for the wrongs committed, presumably for a number of
reasons: (1) the serious nature of the wrong; (2) increasing sophistication as to the causes, which may not with present knowledge be
attributed to the fine hand of providence but rather to lack of care;
and (3) the understanding that the law reflects, perhaps later than
sooner, basic changes in the way society views such matters.1 5
Jefferson: The Curlendercase that you referred to was one of the most
progressive issues that I have had to handle and my greatest disappointment in our present California Supreme Court. In that particular case
we dealt with [a situation in which] parents go to a doctor, or in this case
a lab, and say, "We think we carry a strain called Tay-Sachs disease."
Jews from Eastern Europe possibly carry that strain, and it's admitted
that people who have it will have a child that is born with a life span of
maybe less than ten years with untold pain and agony, going blind and
all sorts of ills. "We want to have a child but we don't want to have a
child if we carry this strain; we'll have such a deformed child." The
defendant, the biochem lab, negligently examined them and came out
with the conclusion, "No, you don't carry the strain." So they had a
child, and they did carry it, and the child was born deformed, under a lot
of pain and suffering. Prior cases-we didn't have any in Californiatalked about what they call "wrongful life," that one should claim that
they shouldn't have been born. 16 Well, how can you value damages as to
when you shouldn't have been born. So I took the view in Curlenderthat
if a defendant, such as this lab or doctor, negligently diagnosed the condition of the parents so that that negligent diagnosis resulted in the birth
of a defective child, that, in my opinion, considering how we in tort law
had said that one is responsible for his foreseeable results in being negligent, the child, even though it has a short life span, ought to have a cause
of action against the defendant for the pain and suffering that it was enduring. The defendants in that case sought review by the California
Supreme Court and couldn't get the votes. It takes four votes to grant a
hearing so that meant my decision stood.
But a couple of years later, along comes a similar case up in Fresno
and in a two-to-one decision of the court of appeal there, they went the
opposite way and said, "Well, we don't believe that a child ought to be
able to get any general damages for pain and suffering." 7 Now, the
15. Id. at 827, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
16. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Stewart v. Long
Island College Hosp., 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1968); Durrer v. St. Michaels Hosp.,
69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
17. See Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
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plaintiffs in that case had petitioned the supreme court for a hearing, and
the hearing was granted, and then the California Supreme Court adopted
the view of that court rather than the view that I had espoused.'" Now
that resulted because the personnel of the supreme court had changed.
Now you had Otto Kaus, who came up from our division in Los Angeles, and I don't know who else. Well, now you had a four-to-three [decision] against Curlender,all because of a change in the make-up of the
supreme court. I recognized as an appellate judge that the supreme court
had the right to change the law, but it just seems to me that they indicated a lack of the kind of foresight that existed in the days of Traynor,
Tobriner, and Sullivan. If they had been on that court, I don't have any
doubt that Curlenderwould have stayed the law. But that's the way the
ball bounces, and when you begin getting change in the court make-up,
you're going to get change in the law. Now, I don't object to that because if it works the other way, I would say I would like to see a liberal
court adopt my views.
I just say that Curlender is a case I was quite proud of and I was
sorry to see it go down the drain ultimately. And it went down the drain
in a very strange way. Maybe to get the votes, what Justice Kaus did was
to say, "Well, we won't allow a child to have any actions for general
damages, but you can for special damages which is the payment of hospital bills and medical [bills]." 1 9 To me, that just didn't make any sense
at all. They should have said, "Well, just no recovery." But I guess
maybe they couldn't get four votes for that so they got four for the middle ground that said no recovery for pain and suffering by the child, but
the special damages.
One other thing happened in that case before that, by a footnote in
Curlender. I even by way of dictum-I admitted it was dictum because
the child wasn't suing his parents-I said a child in this case ought to be
able to sue his parents, if the parents knew.2" I said, "Let's assume we
have a case where the parents know that they carry a strain, and if they
have a child born, that child's going to be defective and suffer." I said a
child ought to be able to sue his own parents in that kind of a case. Well,
that got people and the legislature so worked up that they passed a statute almost the moment that decision came out that no child ought to be
able to sue his parents for that kind of an injury. 2 But, you know, it's a
difference-it all depends on how you view things.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 239, 643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
Id. at 237, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6 (West 1982).
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Drummond v. GeneralMotors Corp.

Doyle: Let's discuss a couple of other cases you've been involved in.
Could you explain your involvment and the significance of Drummond v.
General Motors Corp.?22

Jefferson: Yes, I was the trial judge who decided Drummond v. General
Motors. That case was at a time when the law of strict products liability
for defective design [of] a product was beginning to develop in which you
don't have to prove negligence, but if a manufacturer produces a product
which creates unreasonable risk of harm and of injury, the manufacturer
can be made liable without there being any negligence. And at that time,
let's see, General Motors had put out the first car with an engine in the
back, similar to the Volkswagen, which was the Corvair. And people
were beginning to claim that the Corvair was defective in design, that it
was too heavy for that rear engine as contrasted with the lighter VW
which has the rear engine. So there were a number of suits pending,
what we call single car accidents-people claim they went to make a
curve and turned over or they made a quick turn at a reasonable rate of
speed and the car would flip over.
In this particular case, the driver was a young man on a curve somewhere near the northern part of California, I can't remember the exact
spot. He was on a curve and the car flipped over, so the suit was on the
basis that there was a defective design of the Corvair. There was evidence, though, that he was speeding, for example, so it was a highly contested matter. But what happened was the plaintiff's lawyer had a
number of these cases pending, and they were waiting for one to go to
trial.
I thought we were going to have a jury case, we were getting ready
to impanel a jury for a long trial, and the plaintiff and his attorney decided that they wanted to waive jury and make it a test case as to
whether the Corvair was defectively designed or not. So I guess that case
took close to six months to try because they threw everything in itexperts on both sides, a number of experts. I tried it in the biggest courtroom we had in Los Angeles and it almost looked like a second-hand
automobile repair shop, because they had all of these exhibits and parts
of automobiles. There were a lot of unknown factors, I mean of unknown issues of law as to who had the burden of proof, what had to be
established for a car to be defective in design, any number of issues that
were involved. When all of the evidence was in-I guess it took about
four or five months-I took it under submission and studied the tran22. No. 771-098 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County July 29, 1966) (memorandum disposition).
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script, we had a daily transcript, for the next two months, and then I
wrote a long opinion-I guess it must have been about a hundred
pages-in which I found that there had not been proof that the Corvair
was defectively designed. I think what happened was they first appealed
and then they decided they would settle. So the appellate court never got
to decide whether I was right or wrong.
It became kind of-because of the opinion I wrote-a lead case dealing with the issue of an automobile being defectively designed, I suppose,
just as a matter of interest, all over the world. We had calls for that
opinion in almost every country-Japan, Germany, everywhere. Of
course, General Motors is partly responsible; they were happy about it so
they just spread that decision all around. I remember I got a letter from
Judge Lester Roth on our appellate court and he said, "Well, General
Motors is attaching your opinion as part of its brief in every case now
that deals with products liability, and of course, we read it and I just
want to tell you how I enjoyed your approach and the way that you
handled it. That was the Drummond Case.
D. The Greater Westchester Cases
Doyle: I guess you weren't as dieharded a liberal as people made you out
to be. What was the reaction of the City of Los Angeles to what was
known as the "Greater Westchester"23 cases?
Jefferson: Well, there again, you might say I plowed in new fields. The
Greater Westchester cases [were lawsuits] against the Los Angeles International Airport, which is, in effect, the City of Los Angeles, because it
owns the airport. Those cases arose out of the fact that the airport
opened, I don't know how many years ago, what they called the new
north runway. Before they developed the new north runway, all the runways had been south runways. But the approach to this north runway
was right over Westchester, and the City bought certain numbers of parcels, because it felt the noise level would be such that it would interfere
with people living there. But some felt that they didn't buy enough-and
this was [because ofj the development of the jet aircraft and jet noise. It
didn't buy all of the property so the people who still had property left
decided to sue the City on the grounds that the operation of the aircraft
in landing and takeoff over their property was a nuisance and created
physical and mental harm and anguish. In that case, the question was
23. Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 3d 86, 603
P.2d 1329, 160 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1979), cerL denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980).
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whether or not the City could be held [liable] on a nuisance theory.2 4 In
that case, I decided that noise was at the level that it was a nuisance.
I visited the people and would stand in the homes and see what they
could hear while the aircraft was coming over. There were a lot of defenses which the City raised, what we call federal preemption, that since
the federal statutes, Congress, and aviation authority regulates the takeoff and landing patterns, that the City wouldn't be liable. But the net
result was that after I rendered my decision on it, I advised the City-I
had a number of cases-that it might take the issue up on appeal and see
whether I'm right although the amount of damages at stake was not that
great. The City appealed, and I think it went all the way to the U.S.
Supreme Court, but the appellate courts upheld my decision, the California Supreme Court upheld it, and the Supreme Court of the United
States refused to take it over so that [it] became a new law that the City
could be held liable on a nuisance theory. That's what's known as the
Greater Westchester cases.
E. Daly v. GeneralMotors Corp.
Doyle: In Daly v. GeneralMotors Corp.25 you pointed out that the majority of states are convinced that jurors will be able to compare noncomparables-plaintiffs' negligence with defendants' strict liability for a
defective product-and still reach a fair apportionment of liability. You
considered the majority conclusion a case of wishful thinking and an
application of an impractical, ivory tower approach. What was Daly
about and what was your criticism about?
Jefferson: That was the case of an accident. I don't remember all of the
details, but the suit against General Motors was predicated not on a negligent construction of any part of the automobile, but was based upon
strict liability of an unsafe product. What happened was, in addition, I
think the plaintiff who had maybe a one-car accident was pretty much
dead drunk. But he claimed that his injuries were basically the result of
this defective automobile. And I don't recall now what the defect was,
but there was no showing that General Motors was negligent in any way,
but the California Supreme Court had recently said that a plaintiff's contributory negligence would no longer be a bar to a recovery against a
defendant whose negligence concurs with the plaintiff's negligence to
produce the injury, and that we would have a system of comparative
24. The case dealt with whether the property owners were entitled to recover for physical
and mental injury when the City, without condemning their property, made it uninhabitable.
Id. at 91-92, 603 P.2d at 1330-31, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
25. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
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negligence;2 6

so that if a plaintiff's injury resulted in, let's say, $100,000
in total damages, if the jury were to assess comparative fault, they might
decide that the plaintiff was seventy-five percent negligent and the defendant was twenty-five percent negligent, in which case you'd subtract
seventy-five percent. If there's $100,000 in damages, you'd subtract
$75,000, give the plaintiff $25,000 because even though he was seventyfive percent negligent, he wasn't one hundred percent [at fault]. In that
way you kind of apportion the damages by using comparative negligence
to reduce the amount of injury rather than barring the plaintiff
completely.
Then along came Daly where [the] plaintiff's theory of liability
against the defendant was based on strict liability, which has nothing to
do with negligence, and yet part of the injury was caused by virtue of the
plaintiff's negligence. Can the jury assess the injury in terms of saying
the plaintiff is twenty-five percent at fault and the defendant is seventyfive percent at fault?
I maintain that since the theory of liability, strict liability, is completely different from negligence, that to tell the jury you are to determine what percentage of the plaintiff's damages [was] due to his
negligence and what percentage was due to the defendant's strict liability
in tort, was asking the jury to do an impossible task.2 7 And I still think
that the result is unsound. In other words, all the jury would do if they
feel the plaintiff is at fault because he was negligent, is take something off
the award. But to say that they can realistically compare negligence with
strict liability is a meaningless task.
I think in the long run what the court felt was that a plaintiff in the
situation of this plaintiff, who was pretty much dead drunk, just
shouldn't be able to recover completely all of his damages from the defendant. This is a situation where I think hard cases make bad law. That
was the wrong type of case to go before the supreme court on the question-can you or should you apply comparative negligence when the
plaintiff is seeking to recover against the defendant in strict liability.
F. Cameras in the Courtroom
Doyle: You served as the Judicial Council Chairperson for the Special
Committee on Courts and the Media. Maybe it is appropriate since
we're interviewing you here, what do you think of cameras in the
courtroom?
26. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
27. Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 751, 575 P.2d at 1178, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 395 (Jefferson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Jefferson: Well, I chaired that Committee, appointed by Chief Justice
[Rose Bird] to develop a pilot program on the use of the media and the
courtroom, that is, the use of television and radio. We had a broad spectrum of members on that Committee-judges, people from media, print
media, television, trial judges, people representing groups such as the
League of Women Voters. There were a large number.
What we were seeking to develop was to see if we could work out a
pilot program of the use of media in the courtroom. A number of states
were beginning to develop that way, Florida, for example, Colorado.
The objections made by people were, well, it's going to affect the results
in a courtroom if the judge knows he's in the light of television or the
lawyers know, jurors know, but we said, "Well, let's try it." And so we
set up rules, such as you had to have the consent of the judge, there could
only be one camera, it had to be placed in a particular spot, and if there
were going to be different stations there'd have to be a pooling arrangement. The main thing was to see to it there was not an undue interference with the proceedings. Then we recommended hiring a group that
would make a study to see whether the cameras in the courtroom did
affect the proceedings in terms of the truth finding idea.
The result was the experiment was carried on, I think, for two years
and now it's become permanent. What it does, a judge still has discretion
to say in a particular circumstance, "I don't think this particular trial
ought to be televised." But the main thing was the defendant would not
have an absolute right to say whether he would or would not want television. As far as I know, it's now working successfully and the fears of
people that everybody would act, so that it would be merely a show
rather than a true court conduct, haven't been realized as far as I can
see. I think the judges have been cautious in the way they handle
whether the media should go into the courtroom.
V.

Departure from the Appellate Bench

Doyle: Can you relate why you had to leave the appellate bench and the
circumstances surrounding that?
28
Jefferson: It was purely an economic thing. Under the retirement law,
if you don't retire at least one day before you reach your seventieth birthday, then there's a radical change in your retirement benefits. If you've
served twenty years on the bench, and retire the day before you get to
seventy, you can retire and get seventy-five percent of your salary, and
then if you die after retirement then your widow will get one-half of the
28.

CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 75075-75079 (West 1982).
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seventy-five percent for the rest of her life. If you don't retire by seventy
and then you later die in office or you retire subsequently, your pension
drops to fifty percent of your salary and the widow's benefits are zero. So
unless a judge is independently wealthy so that you don't look at your
salary as necessary income, you more or less feel that you have to retire
in order to protect your widow. So that's why I retired and I'm sure
that's why Don Wright got off, Sullivan in 1969, and most judges are
required to do that.
Now a lawsuit was filed to try to declare that retirement law unconstitutional on the ground that it favored the rich as against the poor, but
the law was upheld here recently by a court of appeal in San Francisco,2 9
and the supreme court didn't take it over so it is still in existence, unless
and until a new law is passed. Just a few months before I had to retire,
the California Trial Lawyers had sponsored an amendment to the Constitution which I guess it would have-no, I think it could have been a
statutory amendment-that would have said you don't have to retire until you're seventy-five, but I was told that Governor Brown was dead set
against it because that would leave too many people on he didn't want to
see stay on, or something like that, and so the author of the bill just
withdrew it after the Governor's office was against it. Every Governor
has been against that type of legislation, and all I can say is it's all political, because we now have the system of the Performadnce Commission, so
that if a judge, regardless of what age, is not performing properly, he can
be removed. [The reason] they said they wanted to have it was, even
though it was economically slanted, they had no way of getting a judge
off of the bench, so he'd stay on to get his salary, even if he was no longer
capable of doing the job. But once this Performance Commission which
could recommend removal existed, it was no longer needed to have any
economic benefits upon an early retirement. But one of these days it may
well happen that you get a Governor who's not interested in appointments, I don't know when, and if so, then would be willing to see legislation go through to permit a judge whose mental faculties and physical
faculties are still sound to stay on.
Doyle: So I can assume that the irony of fighting all these years for racial
equality was not lost on you when you were forced to step down from the
bench due to age discrimination?
Jefferson: So, discrimination of one kind or another is still with us.
29. Rittenband v. Cory, 159 Cal. App. 3d 410, 205 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1984).
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Justice Jefferson as Author

Doyle: How did your expertise in the area of evidence develop that ultimately led to your authoring the Evidence Benchbook ?3o
Jefferson: For some reason that I cannot explain, I fell in love with the
subject of evidence in law school. To the extent that we were using the
professor's casebook, rather than just reading the cases I would go and
read the footnote cases, I just liked to read about evidence. So one day in
class the professor asked a question, and we all were sitting in numbered
seats in a great big semi-circular classroom so he started at the end and
went right on down and nobody seemed to know, and then he hit me,
and I told him the answer and that it's found in 'Jonesv. Smith' and cited
in a footnote on page so and so. He looked surprised, he said, "By jove,
I've asked that question in every class for several years and nobody has
come up with the answer until you did today. You know what that tells
me?" I said, "No, what?" He said, "We need to write a new casebook."
So from that point I have just always had an interest in the law of
evidence.
Now, my reason for writing the Benchbook developed because I became one of the founders of the California Judges' College which holds a
two week session each summer for the training of the new judges who
have been appointed over the past year. We selected various subjects and
I became teacher of the evidence course. So what I did was to start developing a series of hypothetical cases that was used to teach. After several years there was a judge on our bench in Los Angeles Superior Court,
Bill Levitt was his name, and we talked about developing for the college
a series of bench books just for judges' use. And he said, "You've done a
lot of work on evidence, why don't you undertake that?" I said, "Yeah, I
think so." So I started then trying to determine a format and then we got
to the question of let's see who we'll get who'll be interested in publishing
it; we've got to find that out before we go too far, so we talked to West
Publishing and it didn't seem to be interested; then we talked to Dorothy
Nelson who at that time was dean of U.S.C. and head of what is called
the Governing Committee of Continuing Education of the Bar. Of
course, they publish books. She said she'd take it up with the Governing
Committee and they came back and said yes, if I would then consider
that I was writing a book both for judges and lawyers. I said, "Yeah,
maybe that'd be a good idea. Both sides of the profession use the same
text." So that's how it developed. So then I really went to work on it
with intensity.
30. B.

JEFFERSON, supra note

4.
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Doyle: As you may recall, you wrote an article in the HarvardLaw Review in November of 1944 which related to declarations against interest,
an exception to the hearsay rule, and you wrote:
[D]etermining the scope of the exception was largely a matter of
finding some case which had held such evidence admissible. Thus
the scope of an exception was more likely to be determined by
some casual, arbitrary, or accidental circumstance involved in an
early case than by an inquiry into a theory of distinguishing some
hearsay from that generally excluded.3 1
We seem to have in the public's mind a very haphazard system of excluding evidence. Why don't we just give all the evidence to the jury and let
them make the decision?
Jefferson: Well, you've gone back to that article. Let me indicate how
that article happened to be written. That is an excerpt from my doctoral
dissertation when I went back to Harvard when I thought I was going to
stay in teaching-in 1941, 1942-and that became the subject of my doctoral dissertation. So what you quoted from is an excerpt. They asked if
I would cut it down and make it into an article for the Law Review.
The reasons that we just don't let any or all forms of evidence go to
the jury are basically two things, I suppose. One is that we look at trials
as a truth finding function. That being so, we need to try to develop
procedures by which the truth finding function can be carried out. Remembering that juries know nothing about the facts, they have to determine the facts from what they hear. And I suppose over the years that
experience and logic have dictated that people tend to be influenced by
some things more than others, and if you allowed just any kind of evidence to go before a jury they might very easily be influenced to decide a
case by what they heard which might have little relevancy to the facts in
the case. For example, you keep out unduly prejudicial evidence even
though it is relevant. 3' And one of the instances is this matter of a witness' credibility being impeached by conviction of a felony.33 Well, if a
criminal defendant is on trial for possession of narcotics, and if it's shown
that he's been convicted of murder, a lot of people on the jury might say,
"Well, we can't bother about what the judge tells us that we're to use this
conviction solely to attack credibility. If this guy's a criminal five years
ago, he's probably still a criminal. So why don't we just go on and convict him and don't worry about this evidence because once a criminal,
always a criminal."
31. Jefferson, DeclarationsAgainst Interest"An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 58 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 1 (1944).
32. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1982); FED. R. EvID. 403.
33. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 787, 788 (West 1982); FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
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Now, that's one aspect. In terms of what we call the hearsay rule,
that aspect of excluding hearsay really developed historically because we
do have the adversary jury system. The theory of permitting a jury to
decide facts is that you give them the type of evidence that they are going
to be able to determine between witness "A" saying one thing and witness "B" saying another. Well, now what do you present to a jury that
permits them to say, "We think witness A ought to be believed rather
than witness B." There are several things. One is that a witness is before
the court. The jury can see his demeanor when he testifies: is he smiling?
Does he wait ten seconds before he answers each question? In the crossexamination, is his story consistent? Does he come out with inconsistent
statements? Those are the kinds of things that help determine credibility.
Now, we exclude hearsay because the hearsay rule basically excludes evidence of what we call a hearsay declarant, a person who saw
something but isn't in court to tell what he saw. The witness in court is
someone who merely heard the observer say "I saw this accident" or "I
saw this crime." And no amount of cross-examination of the witness in
court who merely heard another person say what that person saw, can
give the jury any idea about whether or not he had the opportunity to
observe what he was supposed to have observed. And for that reason, we
say that hearsay is unreliable. Unreliable, because at the time the person
talks about what he saw, he is not under oath, and he is not subject to
cross-examination.
Now, for any consistent system of evidence and hearsay evidence,
when we say that some hearsay is more reliable than others, there should
be consideration of two factors. One, necessity. If a witness can be put
on the stand, then you shouldn't let the jury hear what he said at some
other time. There's no necessity for it. The second is if there's a necessity
because the person is sick, dead, or otherwise out of the jurisdiction, and,
therefore, unable to testify. Then is there some indicia of trustworthiness
or reliability to his hearsay statement? And in the absence of those two
things, you don't have a good system of evidence going before a jury.
We don't have the two elements in all of the hearsay exceptions.
Some of them have just one of these elements. The exceptions developed
when our law of evidence started changing from the common law. We
had the Model Code developed by the American Law Institute, 34 and
then we had the Uniform Rules, 35 and they created many of these exceptions because they were historical, and so now we live with them, but if
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942).
35. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, 13A U.L.A. (1986) (first adopted 1974).
34.
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we had to do it all over, I'd say we would start by cutting out some of
them that we now have.
VII.
A.

Observations on the Legal Community and the
Practice of Law Today

Attitudes Towards Black Lawyers

Doyle: To what extent do you think the attitude of white lawyers has
changed toward blacks and other minority lawyers in recent years?
Jefferson: I think now the bars are beginning to be more democratic in
their way of thinking so that the attitude of white lawyers has changed.
For example, they now see blacks who are judges and therefore they recognize that ability is not dependent upon one's race or color or ethnic
background, so that I believe more and more the idea that one should be
judged on one's qualifications is becoming more prominent. I don't say
that it's completely changed. I sometimes wonder if the big law firms
that have hired minority members have done so as merely a show of
appearance rather than any real belief. I'm not sure that any of the big
law firms yet have recognized that they ought to give a minority member,
such as a black or an Asian or a Chicano, an opportunity to become a
full partner. But I do know that there are a few blacks in the big law
firms now. But not enough where one can say that it indicates that
there's no longer any prejudice.
Doyle: Has the attitude of blacks changed towards black attorneys over
the years? Do they feel the need to be represented by white attorneys?
Jefferson: That attitude is changing so that I now feel that there is a
greater acceptance of the principle that if the black party has a black
lawyer representing him, the party's going to get good service and do
well in the courts. Now part of that also comes about because we do now
have a sprinkling of black judges throughout the state. Since the black
community knows that, I think it is now a feeling that, "I can be just as
well off with the black attorney and maybe I'm better off, especially if I
land in a courtroom with a black judge. Maybe the judge might be thinking, 'Why didn't you get a black attorney? Didn't you think any of them
were capable of handling your case?'" So I think that has had a backlash effect, which is good, to indicate that a black can be well represented
in court by a black.
Now there's another side of it and that's the question: To what extent do black attorneys draw and develop white clients? That is slowly
developing, but as I see it, there is not much of that. Some, but I think
the white community still does not see the black attorney as one who can
represent him as well. But as time goes on and as more large firms will
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develop and have black lawyers, then I think that the possibility of drawing on the white clients will happen. Now there are companies, for example, that do have black lawyers as in-house counsel and some fairly
good size corporations here and there have also taken on black attorneys
as in-house counsel.
B. The Issue of Attorney Competency
Doyle: Do you think clients tend to be more or less satisfied with their
counsel today than they were in the past when you were practicing law?
Jefferson: I think there's less satisfaction. You're getting into the whole
area that we see developing now of a universal distrust of lawyers and I
think one of the indications of that is we see a lot more of malpractice
lawsuits against lawyers. Back in the '40's and '50's it was almost unheard of for lawyers to be sued on a malpractice basis. First, I think the
doctors started the thing by being the recipients of malpractice suits, but
once that got under way people are beginning to look to any adverse
result by their own counsel as maybe having to do with negligence and
lack of knowledge, so that I think there is just a general trend that the
average person now looks at any bad result and wants to have some redress. Of course, if he loses a lawsuit, then the person to look to for
redress is going to be his counsel. I guess it's difficult to say how widespread that is, but my own belief is that there's just been this development in our society that no one wants to take responsibility for what goes
wrong in his life, and if he can hold somebody else responsible, then he'll
try to do so, so that then the lawyer can become a target if he loses a
case.
Doyle: There's been much criticism, including from the [former] Chief
Justice of the [United States] Supreme Court, regarding the lack of skills
of attorneys, 6 which probably has contributed to some of the attitudes
that some people have toward their counsel. Do you believe that attorneys today are less skilled than they were in the past when you took up
the practice of law?
Jefferson: I recall, I think, several years ago [former] Chief Justice Burger created quite a stir when he made the charge that he felt a large
percentage of lawyers were trying cases that they were incompetent to
try. I take issue with him on that. Of course, I think he mainly may
have been talking about the federal court system and maybe in places
other than California. My experience over the years and as a trial judge,
and as you know I was a trial judge for fifteen years, has been that the
36. See Burger, Some FurtherReflections on the Problemof Adequacy of Trial Counsel, 49
FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1980).
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lawyers that appeared before me have been competent. There's of course
a range of competency. There are those who, you might say, are the top
of the class, and then there are those who are average, but there are very
few instances that I have seen that lawyers came in, and I would end up
saying, "Well, that lawyer ought never to have been in a courtroom."
Somehow, I think that Burger got off on a point that none of us
knows the answer to, and that is: Is there any way that you can train law
students so that when they graduate and walk out of the law school they
can immediately go into court and try a good case? And I don't think we
have the answer to that. We know of course the doctors, when they get
their degrees, work in hospitals and they have this internship and then
the residency, so that by the time they are ready to accept private patients, they have gotten a pretty good experience in the practice of
medicine. But we simply don't have that in law and I don't know how
we can really accomplish it.
Law schools now, of course, try to have the clinical programs, and
maybe all of them do have clinical programs, but that clinical program
doesn't help them actually try a case. They can learn a lot maybe in
terms of being able to talk to a client and advise a client initially, but
when it comes to trying a case somehow that has got to be developed
after one is out of law school. Even though we have the program that
students can work under a lawyer and get some limited training, I think
sometimes we ought to have an intermediate trial court system of cases
that are very small in terms of amount, where law students can try some
jury cases with smaller juries and really develop some skill that way, but
I don't know if that could work. Maybe the client has to suffer at times if
the client has a lawyer with his first jury case and he's struggling to make
a go of it. That's a little tough, but everybody has to have a first experience, and I just don't know how you can avoid that. I don't see that the
lawyers today are any better equipped or any less equipped. I think all
along, the law schools are generally doing a good job in teaching the
substantive law and that is what the law school is suited for, and that
once a person passes the bar and gets into practice that confidence has to
come through experience.
Doyle: When you were a judge, did you ever feel that it was your duty or
did you ever help out the struggling attorney that was trying to try his
case?
Jefferson: Yes, and among the judges we used to have quite a difference
of opinion expressed. Some judges feel if a lawyer is struggling and the
client has a good case, he shouldn't just let that case go down the drain
without at least trying to show some signs of how to help the lawyer. But
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there are others who say the position of the judge is simply to referee and
if the client has chosen a poor lawyer, even though he has a good case, it
has to go down the drain. I used to try to occupy a middle ground. I
tried all through the years, you might say, to be a teaching judge. I
would not necessarily help a lawyer win a case, but if I could help him in
getting some better techniques or understanding of how to try a case, I
would do so. And if I knew a lawyer who just didn't know how to ask a
question, sometimes I would get into the fray, so to speak, and ask the
witness a question. My own feeling is that judges should be more than a
pure referee and that you're interested in seeing that justice is done. Of
course, within limits you can't necessarily decide where justice is between
two parties, but I always hated to see a case in which one lawyer so far
outclassed the other that it could create a bad result. But I don't have
that pessimism about the ability of lawyers, because I think it comes with
time and that most of the lawyers coming into court are fairly well
prepared.
C. Affordability of Legal Services
Doyle: Do you think legal services are more affordable today than they
were in the past?
Jefferson: Well, let me start on this question of legal services and how
affordable they are by pointing to a saying that sometimes exists and
maybe refers especially to criminal cases. There are two classes of citizens or people in the community who get the best legal services. One is
the very rich who can obviously hire the most skilled of lawyers, and the
other, the poor, who have nothing and who will be represented by attorneys in the Public Defenders' office who are highly qualified. The ones in
between who have a little money must hire, you might say, the lawyer on
the fringe who is in his first case or maybe doesn't practice criminal law
but has taken the case in order to try to develop it. It's that class of
persons, those with just a little money, who are in the worst fix.
I'm not too sure of the answers to whether legal services are less
affordable than they were before. Of course, legal fees have gone up like
everything else. I suppose when it comes to legal services, we're not
quite like the medical field where Medicare will pay for the person who
can't afford to get medical services. And yet, we don't have that same
type of thing with legal services. The public law firms I think are one of
the great benefits of our present system and I hated to see and hate to see
the budget of the national government cut back on providing funding to
the public law firms and legal services to the poor.
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Maybe my answer to you is that, well, it could be one of two things:
either good legal service is less affordable now so that we have greater
need for public service or pro bono work by lawyers, or else in the old
days, or former days, perhaps people did not seek out legal services,
maybe they simply accepted the results or situations that were unfair or
improper or against them and simply did not even try to do anything
about it. I'm not sure of what the true situation is. My incliniation,
however, is to say that-like with this malpractice situation-people just
now are not willing to sit by and say, "Well, this is just my bad luck."
They're going to try their best to get legal redress. Yet there are many
poor people who simply haven't the money to hire lawyers and the only
way to get legal services is through public spirited law firms or pro bono
work or the firms that are set up and somehow finance and render services to people who need service and can't afford it.
Doyle: One of the big issues with the bar today is whether an attorney as
part of his oath is required to take on a certain percentage of pro bono
cases. Some attorneys have referred to it as involuntary servitude.
What's your thought on requiring attorneys as part of their license to
take on a small percentage of pro bono cases?
Jefferson: My own feeling is that lawyers ought to take on pro bono
work. I think it's unfortunate that we have to ask a question, "Should
lawyers be forced to do so?" It just seems to me that every lawyer ought
to consider it a privilege that he has to become a lawyer, to be a lawyer,
and to perform the services which lawyers perform. So it seems to me
that we ought not have to say there ought to be a rule of court, for example, that if you're going to become a lawyer, then you're going to have to
agree to do a certain amount of pro bono work. I think it ought to be
expected, and I for one would urge that it be a part of one's duty in
becoming a lawyer-that if you are not willing to do a minimum amount
of pro bono work, then you ought not to be in the field of law.
That's not a popular view, I know. Lawyers say, "Well, let those do
pro bono work who want to and not insist that others do it." But, for
example, the lawyers who take appellate court work and get on the list to
do cases do get paid a minimum sum, but I've always taken the view that
there should be no attempt by the courts to pay the going rate. To me,
that's a part of really pro bono work. And when lawyers take on assignments to write briefs at the appellate level, they should look upon it as
part of a pro bono activity. But I know there are many lawyers who take
an opposite view and say, "Well, that's the same as if you want to do
church work or any other form of public work, work with hospitals or a
charitable organization. You should be free to do it if you want to, and if
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you don't want to do it, you should not be required." But I just feel that
the law should be considered such a high calling and [that it is] a privilege to be a lawyer that it ought to be part of the expectation, and if one
doesn't want to do that, then he should choose another profession.
Doyle: What advice do you give to students who are entering law
school?
Jefferson: One of the things, of course, I always try to stress upon students is the exacting nature of lawyering, that they ought not to be going
into it unless they are prepared to do a lifetime of studying. Law is always changing, and as a matter of fact, it's a lawyer's duty to try to
make changes in the law and therefore it requires a rigorous attitude of
mind to continue to study all throughout their legal career.
I also try to point out what I've just been talking about-the pro
bono aspects of law-that I hope they're not going into law solely because it's a good money making profession. Their attitude should be that
law is the very foundation of our society. The only way we can function
is through a good legal system that seeks to protect the rights of one
citizen against another, the rights of one citizen against the government,
and they're doing a service to the community to the extent that they
become proficient in law and ought to be willing to help irrespective of
the amount of money they're going to get. I try to tell students, for example, if they see a good case that develops a good point of law, they
shouldn't think in terms of, "Well, I can't spend a hundred hours on this
case, because the client can only pay me for ten hours." But if that case
represents a good legal principle that needs to be established, then they
should be prepared to do the amount of work that is necessary. But I
sometimes think maybe that goes in one ear and out the other.
D. Views on Litigation in American Society
Doyle: We discussed the fact that the populace is becoming more critical
of the services that they receive and are seeking redress more often. Do
you think, as many people have commented, that we are becoming or are
a litigious society?
Jefferson: There is no doubt in my mind that our society believes in
litigation. But I don't criticize that. The so-called adversary system that
we have by which disputes are determined, I think is essential. It's the
one way results happen. If you go back to the civil rights movement,
back during the times when Rosa Parks refused to move from the front
of the bus to the back, now she knew what that was going to mean-that
she could be arrested-but she was prepared at that time to test the system. And that's the only way, it seems to me, that you can-I shouldn't
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say the only way-but it's one way we get progress through people being
willing to test the system and to sue in order to test it.
I don't mean to say that litigation is the only method; conciliation
and mediation are also means of solving disputes, but it seems to me,
where people believe they have certain rights, that the best way to advance them is a lawsuit in which each side puts forth its views, and then
you have a judicial determination of which is the correct view of the law.
If you don't have a society that wants to litigate matters, then I think you
just go along with the laws which might be harmful, laws which might be
unconstitutional. If people don't sue to test the law-is that a good society where people are afraid to test out what their rights are? Now, some
say that we carry it to the extreme and people are too quick to say,
"Well, if you don't see it my way, all right, then you'll hear from my
lawyer," or "I'll meet you in court," in an effort to browbeat the other
side into submission, perhaps.
But I think it's a good thing that we do believe in litigation. I think
medicine has advanced more because of that. Once doctors knew that
they could be sued for malpractice, I think it has meant that doctors and
hospitals are using and have used a lot more care in the way they handle
cases and the way they explain things to patients. So that I think it has
raised the standard of medical care and I think the fact that lawyers are
now more subject to malpractice suits tends to raise the level of
competence.
The average lawyer, for example, at one time would decide that he
would take any kind of case. If somebody brought him a very complex
civil matter that dealt with government regulations or dealt with tax law,
or corporate law, he would not worry that he didn't know too much.
He'd say, "Well, I can study a little bit." But now, I think, no lawyer is
going to take any complex case unless he begins to get some advice from,
say, the expert.
Just the other day I was talking with a lawyer abou taxation and he
was saying, "Well, when I went to law school I didn't take anything
about taxes." And I said, "I didn't take it either, because I didn't feel
that I was going to need to know too much about income tax and other
things." But then the lawyer said, "You know, it's a different story now
because now even in divorce cases if you're working out a settlement,
you're going to have to think in terms of what are the tax consequences
to your client if you agree to a particular settlement. And if you don't
know that, and you go ahead and make a settlement without it, and lo
and behold, the client then goes to another lawyer and says, 'Look,
shouldn't my lawyer have known that, by going with this method, how
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much more taxes I'm going to have to pay?'" And here comes a possible
suit for malpractice. But what that does is make or should make every
lawyer be on his toes. Have I considered all the ramifications when I
give this particular type of advice? Whereas it used to be, well, if things
didn't work out the client's going to say, "Well, it's just too bad." Like a
doctor would say, "Too bad, the operation was successful but the patient
died."
Doyle: In your experience as a judge, do you think there really is a serious problem, as [former] Chief Justice Burger has recently alluded to, of
the so-called frivolous lawsuit in America?37
Jefferson: No, that's another one of his views that I strenuously oppose
and with which I disagree. It's true that there are certain frivolous lawsuits, but again there are many lawsuits that one might start out by saying it's frivolous when it turns out not to be. And that gets us into the
whole concept of the doctrine of stare decisis. A lot depends on how you
define what's a frivolous lawsuit. If a frivolous lawsuit is said to be one
that you know that you don't have a leg to stand on, then if you bring
such a lawsuit, you can be accused of bringing a frivolous lawsuit. I dare
say that going back historically where the Supreme Court of the United
States had said on a number of occasions, "Separate but equal is all that
the Constitution requires,"38 so therefore the southern states can set up
two separate systems of education and that's the law. If someone considers that an incorrect interpretation of the Constitution, and challenges
that interpretation in court, he could be criticized for filing a "frivolous
lawsuit." However, that so-called frivolous lawsuit can change the law.
For example, opponents of the separate but equal doctrine kept hammering away at it and finally in Brown v. Board of Education,3 9 it got
knocked out.
But that's just one of many examples. I think that the reason [former] Chief Justice Burger is saying that there are too many frivolous
lawsuits is that he just hates to see the status quo questioned. I don't
care what that status quo is; he hates to see it questioned, he hates to see
the courts flooded with litigation. It'd be all nice if we didn't have to have
lawsuits but if a person feels that his rights are being invaded, then the
only way to test it is to bring a lawsuit.
37. See Burger, Time to Review Our Reliance on the Adversary System: Chief Justice
FaultsLawyersfor Frivolous Suits, Discovery Abuse, L.A. Daily J., Feb. 15, 1984, at 4, col. 3
(address at ABA midyear meeting, Las Vegas).
38. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
39. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Now, I'll take several types of cases that some people consider frivolous. In Los Angeles we had this restaurant-it was in all the papers-a
man had a number of booths and they had booths that had curtains and
he set it up for intimacy for couples. And here one evening two lesbians
came in and made a reservation in one of the booths, and he said, "No,
this has to be for couples not of the same sex, so you can't have one of
these booths." So, of course, a lawsuit developed.'
The restaurant was sued on the grounds that that was a violation of
equal rights, and the plaintiffs prevailed. Now a lot of people would say
that there shouldn't be any lawsuit over an issue like that.
I remember another one which was at Ojai, I believe. I remember
that because the Academy of Appellate Court Lawyers had its meetings
then so I was there for a couple of occasions. I don't remember the details now, but the rule was that gentlemen must wear a tie and coat. So
this fellow came and he was dressed without a tie and coat, but I think he
had on a matching pants and coat with a sports shirt, but no tie. He said,
"One is not supposed to wear a tie with this outfit." They said, "Sorry."
He said, "Well, you're not making women wear any ties; they come in
wearing dresses or pantsuits." So he sued.4 1 Well, he won. I see absolutely nothing wrong with that because to me whether it's a child suing
through its parents because of some school regulation as to dress codes,
that's the only way you test the legality. To me, if a person feels that a
practice needs changing because it's illegal, then he's entitled to sue.
Sometimes he can be wrong, but half of the people are always wrong in a
lawsuit. Are you going to say that all lawsuits are frivolous because
everybody can't win? That's the Burger approach, and I for one feel that
that's what the court system exists for.
I just don't think there are too many frivolous lawsuits; there can be
some if by frivolous you mean that looking at aspects of the case, you
don't have what you might say a reasonable basis for thinking that
you've got a legal position. If a lawyer takes a lawsuit just because he
wants to earn some money and to win a fee, and really has no leg to stand
on-doesn't have even a colorable theory-well maybe you can call that
frivolous, but there aren't too many frivolous lawsuits. What I dislike
about Burger's statement is that what he tends to be saying is to discourage people from filing lawsuits that somebody hasn't got a precedent already for it. I hope his views don't scare off lawyers who want to file
lawsuits because they believe that there's a fundamental right that they're
seeking to enforce.
40. Rolon v. Kulwitzky, 153 Cal. App. 3d 289, 200 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1984).
41. Hales v. Ojai Valley Inn Country Club, 73 Cal. App. 3d 25, 140 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1977).
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Observations on Juries

Doyle: There's been a lot of criticism of the jury system. What are your
thoughts and reflections on juries in general?
Jefferson: Over the years I have sat civil more than I have criminal,
although I did sit in criminal for a couple of years. All through the years,
as far as my own court was concerned, we, when I say we, I'd have a
little game with my clerk, with my bailiff, and my court reporter and say,
"All right, let's speculate on what this verdict's going to be." And you
know, in the great majority of instances the jury came out the way we
expected. And I've heard other judges say the same thing: that for the
most part the juries have not gone awry in terms of being way off from
their verdicts.
One of the interesting things about this is that in many instances we
have to talk with the jurors afterwards. I would know that they had
reached the right decision but by the wrong way. Something would make
them decide to go a certain way. And yet if they had considered what I
consider to be the things I think they ought to have, they would have
reached the same result. But we never know why juries react the way
they do. As a matter of fact, they aren't supposed to tell you anyway.
The thought processes by which a jury reaches a verdict always is supposed to be kept secret.
But my own feeling is that the jury verdicts are right in ninety to
ninety-five percent of the cases. It's only a rare case that I think the jury
goes haywire, that a lawyer is able to sell a jury on a bill of goods that
does not constitute the right track and the right decision.
The major criticisms, if you're going to criticize the jury system,
would be in two or three areas. One area would be in the length of time
that it takes to select a jury. Lawyers love to be able to take all kinds of
time in voir diring a jury with the idea in mind that they use that to
educate the jury as to their side of the case. Now that isn't what it's for,
but that's what happens. Or to provide a good basis for the exercise of
peremptory challenges to [remove] the ones they think are going to be
against them. I have believed that the system of the federal courts is
certainly preferable to the state in terms of the speed in which you can
get a jury selected because they, the federal judges, do their own questioning of the juries, prospective jurors, and the lawyers are simply not
given that opportunity. The state lawyers will say, "Well, we don't like
the federal system at all because that doesn't give us a chance to become
acquainted with the jury." But my answer is that you do not need to get
acquainted with the jury. Once that jury is selected, they are supposed to
hear the case and decide it on the facts, not on the lawyer who tries to get
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them preconditioned by those questions. So I think that is a major criticism of the state practice of permitting the voir dire of the jury to a great
extent by lawyers.
The other is perhaps that we have too many peremptories. You cut
down on the peremptory challenges, and that would help you get a jury
selected faster.
One other [area] that I have thought about and advocated, but
there's very little support for it, [is to] change the number. In civil cases
there's no reason why we should have to have a jury of twelve people.
Even in criminal cases-and this, you might say, is really hitting at the
heart of defense lawyers-for minor cases we can have a number less
than twelve. For misdemeanors, for example, there's no reason why we
couldn't have a jury of six or seven. Legally, that could be done, and you
could even change-in criminal cases, you could get a verdict for less
than the full majority. Oregon, for example, in its major felonies, has
twelve jurors, but they can get a verdict by ten.
Now those are suggestions that certainly would speed up trials. But
try and get something like that through the legislature. The large
number of lawyers-and I don't blame lawyers as such-if they feel they
work better if they have twelve jurors with all of the peremptories in civil
cases and in criminal, too, then it's a matter of a personal feeling. But
again, I have said to lawyers at times, "Now, the public can get fed up
with what we do and maybe one of these days they will get fed up with
the length of time it takes to select juries and with the number of twelve
and maybe we'll get an initiative through that nobody will like. Maybe
it would be far better, for example, if the legal profession were to think in
terms of themselves trying to suggest changes that might speed up the
system and still preserve intact the jury system, we'd be better off." But
I'm not sure that that does anything but fall on deaf ears.
Doyle: Do you think juries have changed over the last forty years? Have
they become more sophisticated?
Jefferson: I think so. One of the reasons, you might say, that people
generally become more sophisticated is because of the advent of television where they see news presented. Maybe people don't read as much
anymore, but they certainly, by looking at television, get a taste of what's
happening in the world. But I think the change is in the makeup of the
jury system now, once the U.S. Supreme Court began saying that for a
person to have a fair trial, the jury makeup should be of a pretty good
cross section of the community, and that no significant segment of the
community ought to be arbitrarily refused permission to serve on a
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jury.4 2 We have started to get a better representation of the community.
We have started getting a better cross section of women. Of course, at
one time there were no women who served on juries. A conscious effort
is now made to pick juries from a system that will give you a pretty good
cross section with a good representation of minorities. Take, for example,
if you limit the selection of your jury panel to those registered voters,
look at the people who are kept off because there are a lot of people who
don't register to vote. So you can throw in additional names, such as
from the driver's licenses, for example; there are far more people who
have driver's licenses than who are registered to vote, so that is a method.
And you draw people from other types of lists. The main thing is I think
now we get a better cross section. These people will bring to bear upon
the determination of what the facts are in a case; they're going to have
different experiences and that discussion in the jury room should lead to
a better result.
IX.

The Judiciary and Judicial Activism

Doyle: Let's discuss the judiciary. Do you think the public really understands the role of the judiciary in our society?
Jefferson: I don't believe that they understand the role as much as they
should, and by that I mean they have a lot of misconceptions. Of course,
part of the misconception can come from people who dislike decisions
that are reached. Maybe, too, the courts have simply not publicized the
role of the courts.
For example, I'm not sure that all people realize that a judge is not
free to hand down any sentence he desires, that the range of sentencing is
tied by the legislature. The legislature decided, and yet the public will
say, "Why should this person get only these many years?" as if the courts
and the judges had the right to decide that. So there comes a misconception as to what determines how much time a person who's been convicted should get. That's one thing.
Another possible misconception comes from a misunderstanding of
what is meant by interpreting the law. Take, for example, if a legislature
passes a law, there are those who feel, "Well, why should the courts declare that law unconstitutional?" They do not realize that under the system of the three branches of government-the executive, the legislative,
and the judicial-that it was long since determined back by Justice John
Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court that it's the judiciary that must de42. See generally Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 497 nn. 6-8 (1972) (citing cases where the
Court has reversed convictions for failure to have representative grand juries, petit juries, or
both).
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termine the interpretation of whether legislation is consitutional.43 Now
the Framers didn't have to do it that way. They could have written into
the Constitution that each branch of government does what it wants to
do and decides whether it's in conformity with the Constitution. But I
think that most people would say that then you might as well not have a
Constitution. If every law that the legislature passes is constitutional and
everything the executive wants to do is constitutional, and there's nobody
to put a brake on the actions of the two other branches, then we wouldn't
have the kind of democracy that we have. So I think that if people are
told, they'll realize the wisdom of the system that permits the judiciary to
determine whether legislation is constitutional, and whether action of the
government violates the rights of an individual. But people are prone to
say that if they don't like decisions the courts make, the judiciary is
legislating when all it should be doing is interpreting the law.
I know that there is room for difference of opinion of whether you
have an activist court, whether you have a court that says, "We're exercising judicial restraint." But beyond that, it just seems to me that people do not sufficiently understand the role of the court and I think
lawyers are subject to some censure for, let's say, not playing a greater
role in educating the public as to what is the function of the courts and
why, just because they don't like a decision, that doesn't mean that the
court is doing something wrong.
Doyle: The California Supreme Court was considered in the time of
Chief Justices Traynor and Gibson as perhaps the best state court in the
country. Do you believe that it still should be considered one of the leading courts in the United States?
Jefferson: I don't know what is happening much in other courts, so it's
pretty difficult to say as to whether it still ought to be considered one of
the leading courts in the country. One of the reasons why it was held in
such high esteem was that at the time you're talking about, they had
Justice Traynor, Justice Tobriner, and Justice Sullivan, for example, and
Justice Peters. But those three that I've just mentioned---Traynor, Tobriner, and Sullivan-in my opinion, were legal giants. For example, in
the field of tort law many of the dissents written by Traynor over the
years became the law of tort, so he was recognized as one of the leaders.
Maybe in time, there are those on the bench now who can occupy similar
positions, but I'd have to say as of the moment, I don't see that we have
any triumverate up there that would match the triumverate that I just

spoke about.
43. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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I want it understood that I'm not criticizing the caliber of the present court. I'm simply saying that I don't believe that in terms of their
overall influence, that they occupy as preeminent a position as the three
that I mentioned. I think it's a good court, there's not any doubt about
that; it's a good court now, and maybe it's unfair to try to compare
courts in terms of greatness because the ones up there haven't been there
that long. Whether or not, for example, the court would have been considered great the moment Traynor got on or Tobriner or Sullivan.
Maybe as of that time, we wouldn't have been able to say that court is a
great court and a great leader in the country. But certainly as time went
on, they were. And I'd say we'd have to give some more years yet to see
whether the group we have up there now starting with Chief Justice Rose
Bird will be great." Now of course, Stanley Mosk has been a standout
over the years and he's still there, but beyond Mosk all of the others
really are fairly new when you consider that Otto Kaus, Cruz Reynoso,
Alan Broussard, Joseph Grodin and the last one, Malcolm Lucas, they
haven't been up there long. There's just no way that you can necessarily
predict as to which ones, if any, will become great given a long time.
Doyle: What are your thoughts and reflections on Rose Bird? She has
been very heavily criticized.
Jefferson: Well, I think she has been criticized unjustly. I don't think
it's justified. I think she's a good scholar, even though she was limited in
experience before getting on the bench. If a person dislikes liberal philosophy, then they can dislike Rose Bird because she is pretty consistent in
her liberal views, and I happen to be of that same persuasion, so I like
what she writes, and I like her opinions. I don't know too much about,
you might say, the administration of the court, whether she is subject to
some criticism for administration or not.
But I think people just got against her because Brown appointed her
chief justice without having the kind of experience that most people
would expect the chief justice to have. She obviously didn't come in with
the experience of Chief Justice Donald Wright who had been up through
the court system. I guess Roger Traynor was put on the bench without
judicial experience, but he was there for some time before he was made
chief justice. I've forgotten what the background of Chief Justice Gibson
was, as to whether he was on the bench first or whether he was on the
court of appeal first. I think the criticism was that Brown should have
made somebody else chief justice and let her gain some experience, and
44. This interview was conducted prior to the November, 1986 reconfirmation election in
which the California voters denied reconfirmation to Chief Justice Rose Bird, and Justices
Joseph Grodin and Cruz Reynoso.
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maybe she would not have been subjected to the criticism which she had.
But certainly a lot of it simply is not justified. She's a very sincere person
and there are those who just don't like the way she thinks, and nothing
she can do in their eyes would be right anyway. But I think she's a good
person for the court.
Doyle: Do you believe the courts have assumed too great a role in making changes in our society, and if they have assumed too great a role, do
you think they should cut back and become more conservative?
Jefferson: No, I look at it that it's fortunate that we've had what I would
call liberal judges on the U.S. Supreme Court. I would rue the day if we
had not had people like Earl Warren, who became Chief Justice. I go
back to something that I said before. In the days of Roosevelt, go back to
the '30's, McReynolds, Van Devanter, Butler on that U.S. Supreme
Court, the doctrine of separate but equal was simply sacred, and if that
Court had remained that way, we wouldn't have the end of segregation.
But we got judges up there that finally took a different view. A good case
was presented, psychological evidence was presented that showed that
black children suffered when they were made to go to a school that was
all black. They were made to feel that they were inferior, and then the
Court finally said, well, this doctrine of separate but equal is in violation
of equal protection of the laws.45
Now there are people who say Whatever the law becomes at one
time ought not to be changed; that it should remain that way. One of the
major goals of the Constitution is to protect the minority from what you
might say are the acts of the majority. If we didn't have a Constitution,
Congress could pass a law and say that only white males are going to
have the right to vote, the right to do this, the right to own property,
females are not going to have any rights, blacks, anyone else. And therefore, you have to look to the Court to interpret the language in such a
way that it does what it's designed to do.
Now, I'm a great believer in a Supreme Court decision which a lot
of people are against-the decision which safeguarded the right of privacy. 46 Now those words are not in [the Constitution]. But when the
Supreme Court looked at the abortion cases4 7 and said that a woman's
right to privacy should entitle her to have an abortion as a constitutional
right, there are those who would say, well, that's judicial activism. But I
45. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
46. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
47. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106
(1976).
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don't care what you call it, I say it's interpreting the Constitution.
Whenever people say, "Well, that's not in the Constitution. Where do
you find it?"-I can't remember the Justice who said, "The Constitution
is what we say it is." 4 And it's just that simple-you can interpret language anyway you want to, and they interpret the other literal wording
to say that there's still a right of privacy, and that covers a lot of the
search and seizure problems. So this business of activism versus, you
might say, strict construction, so-called strict construction, in my opinion, is simply another way of saying, "Let's protect the status quo for the
majority." That isn't what the Constitution was written for.
Doyle: As far as the California Supreme Court is concerned, can you
think of any examples where the court has been judicially active and
really benefited the people of California?
Jefferson: Well, I don't consider what has happened judicial activism as
such. If you disagree with a decision then you can say it's judicial activism. But I simply construe all that the court has done is to interpret the
Constitution the way it should be interpreted.
Let me give you an example-I don't know if you've heard of a case
9-which I conducted as a trial judge
called Serrano v. Priestgg
in which a
group of parents and children from one of the poorer school districts in
the state brought suit to have declared that the method of funding public
schools by property taxes in the particular school district was in violation
of equal protection of the laws. What was happening was that in a poor
school district, there just wasn't enough valuable property to raise much
taxes. Only about, say, $600 and something was being spent per child.
And yet, you take a rich school district like Beverly Hills, in Los Angeles, they were spending over $2,000 per child. Now that came before me
as a trial judge. About the same time that that suit developed, let me say
this, the plaintiffs in that lawsuit were charging that not only did it violate the Federal Constitution's Equal Protection Clause, but it violated
the state constitution.
Right in the middle of the lawsuit, another lawsuit had been filed in
Texas in the federal court and they had exactly the same system.50 It was
48. "We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is. ..."
C.E. Hughes, Speech before the Elmira Chamber of Commerce (May 3, 1907), in ADDRESSES
AND PAPERS OF CHARLES EVAN HUGHES, 1906-1908, at 139 (R. Fuller ed. 1903).
49. 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Clowes
v. Serrano, 432 U.S. 907 (1977). See also Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 141
Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977) (upholding attorney fee award based on a "private attorney general"
rationale).
50. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959
(1973).
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students of a poor district suing the state to force a different basis of
funding, and they alleged simply a violation of the Federal Constitution.
And right in the midst of my lawsuit, the U.S. Supreme Court said that
the plaintiffs were not entitled to win because there was nothing in the
U.S. Constitution talking about protecting education as such.5 1 Well, the
federal government didn't have any fundamental interest in education
and a state could in its system of distribution of educational funds permit
one district to be poorer than the other. So, lo and behold, when that
came up, the defendants, which were the richer school districts, moved,
you might say, for summary judgment in my case on the grounds that I
had to follow the U.S. Supreme Court in what was called the Rodriguez
suit. But of course, the California Supreme Court, and this is what,
some people would say, had been activist, in the sense that [the justices]
had been interpreting language of the state constitution in a different way
than the U.S. Supreme Court interprets the same language in the U.S.
Constitution. So I simply said that as far as I'm concerned, there are
various places in the California Constitution where they talk about education and so that it's of great interest, a fundamental and compelling
state interest, and that therefore, this method in California violated the
state constitution. Now that was appealed, and the California Supreme
Court affirmed my view and so we got a different result from what the
people did in Texas.
Now some would say that that's judicial activism and I say, "No, it
isn't. It's just simply interpreting the [state] constitution to produce a
result which you think is fair. And when you do that, you're no more
legislating than if you were to interpret the other way." That's an example of what I consider not activism. To me, I would say that's judicial
restraint; you're not making new law, you're interpreting the law.
X.

The Exclusionary Rule

A. The Rule
Doyle: The exclusionary rule represents in some people's minds one example of judicial activism. Could you briefly explain what the exclusionary rule5 2 is and how it came into existence?
Jefferson: You asked about the exclusionary rule. How did it come into
existence? This goes back to a matter of interpretation basically of some
of the first ten Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, and
perhaps the most important, is the Fourth Amendment, which provides
51. Id. at 33.
52. See generally Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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basically in its language that persons shall be secure in their homes,
houses, their persons, their papers, and effects from unreasonable search
and seizure.5 3 Now that's all that the Fourth Amendment says. It
doesn't say what happens if a police officer or any governmental agency
violates one's right to be secure in his person and his property from unreasonable search and seizure. But as the U.S. Supreme Court has done
on other occasions, the question arose, well, why have a right if you don't
have a remedy? What are the remedies if the police officer makes an
illegal search and seizure from the person of contraband or evidence of
any kind? What is the remedy? Well, it was argued that there are two.
One remedy would be to have the individual whose rights have been violated to sue for damages; sue the police officer. Another remedy would
be to have a state pass a statute that makes it a crime for an officer to
violate one's constitutional rights. I think the Court determined that
those remedies were in name only.54 You're not going to get anywhere
trying to sue a police officer for damages, and states are not going to
prosecute police officers. So then the Court adopted the rule that in order to have a real remedy that was effective, the remedy would be to
exclude evidence that has been illegally obtained. 5 That has been the
remedy now for a number of years. There are those, of course, who say
that the Constitution doesn't say that and therefore that remedy
shouldn't be interpreted to be a constitutional remedy. There are two
explanations sometimes given for that remedy of exclusion of evidence
illegally obtained. One thought is that it is necessary to deter the police
from illegal conduct.5 6 I know that if as a policeman, I go out and seize
evidence illegally, the evidence is going to be excluded, and I might even
lose a conviction. That ought to act as a deterrent for future cases. Another explanation or justification for the exclusionary rule is to protect
the integrity of the court.57 That if the court does not exclude the evidence, it, in effect, is sanctioning illegal conduct by a government official,
and the courts ought not to have any part in that. Now that's the justification and that's the theory of the exclusionary rule.
B. The Rule and the Black Community
Doyle: In your experience has the black community had a poor relationship with the police that does in part justify the need for an exclusionary
rule?
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

U.S. CONsr. amend. IV.
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 632, 652-53, reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 871 (1961).
See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656, 657-58.
Id. at 659-60.

Winter 1987]

JUSTICE BERNARD S. JEFFERSON

Jefferson: Well, I think the exclusionary rule is justified in connection
with all segments of the community. It hasn't anything to do with the
black community. Certainly the black community has had its share of
illegal police conduct in the sense of mistreatment at times. But I don't
look at the exclusionary rule as necessarily being required because the
police will violate the rights of blacks sooner than they'll violate the
rights of the majority of the community. What is important, and I think
this is what a lot of people don't see, they think in terms of, well, if a
person is guilty then he ought to be convicted, irrespective of how the
government obtained its evidence. What is wrong with that is if once you
indicate to the police that they are free to violate one's rights and seize
property at will, what would preclude the police from deciding that too
much crime has taken place in a particular neighborhood or they simply
don't like the people who live in a certain neighborhood? They then
would simply go and break in everybody's door and see what they can
find. And if you didn't have an exclusionary rule, that evidence would be
admitted, and you might say, "Yes, but that means every person that you
get is going to be guilty." But my answer is, "What citizen wants to
think or would agree to the idea that since he doesn't have anything, I
mean he's not concealing any contraband, that the police ought to be free
to force him to open his door and let them search?" I think the average
citizen would rise up in horror at that thought, and yet that could be the
result if once you say, well, if the police happen to pick on you and find
some contraband then you have no remedy.
Doyle: Part of the great debate over the exclusionary rule is the cause
and effect that the rule has. This is a twofold question. Do you think that
the exclusionary rule, first of all, causes a significant amount of crime?
And do you think that the exclusionary rule really has deterred police
misconduct?
Jefferson: I don't think the exclusionary rule has caused the commission
of crime. I don't see how, by excluding evidence that has been illegally
seized, that encourages criminals to conduct their activities and be free
from being caught. Statistics indicate that there are very few cases that
have been lost because of the exclusionary rule.5" Every now and then
we hear about a defendant who has to go free because the only evidence
which the police had was secured illegally. But those are few instances,
and those of us who believe in the exclusionary rule would say the great
good of the exclusionary rule to the vast majority of citizens is far superior to doing away with the exclusionary rule and thereby saying, well,
we won't allow any guilty person to go free.
58. Cf Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218-19 n.8 (1960).
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Doyle: Do you think it has deterred police misconduct?
Jefferson: Yes, my own view would be that most police officers, knowing
the exclusionary rule-they are given training about what they can and
what they cannot do-are not going to deliberately violate one's rights
once they know that what they find is not going to be admitted in evidence. They are not going to lose a good case, because if they take their
time, chances are that they're going to be able to get a search warrant, an
arrest warrant, and therefore get the evidence that they need legally. Actually we've had a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1984 which
now, I think, would be of great assistance to the police in seeing that they
don't violate the exclusionary rule. For example, the Leon59 case said
that if a policeman gets a search warrant from a judge or magistrate, and
then the policeman executes the warrant and believes in good faith that
he had the right to get the warrant, the evidence seized is going to be
admitted even though it has been illegally obtained. Now, of course,
that's one of the decisions by which the U.S. Supreme Court has gradually narrowed the exclusionary rule. Because a police officer, it seems to
me, can easily say, "I presented in affidavit my facts to the judge. He
granted a search warrant; I believe there was probable cause for the
granting, probable cause to believe that the person whose home we are
searching possessed the contraband." Therefore, that particular type of
evidence illegally seized is going to get admitted because of the so-called
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in the case of a search
warrant.
XI.

Civil Rights and Civil Liberties

Doyle: What was your reaction when Brown v. Board Of Education '
was decided?
Jefferson: I had two reactions. One was-that's a good decision, it's
long overdue. But I have one criticism of it. This is where the practical
side of the law comes in, and I suppose the Court had to do it. Up to
Brown v. Board of Education, generally it was said whenever the Court
says you have a constitutional right, you have it right then and there.
You don't have to wait to get it. But, of course, they used the practicality that creates untold confusion. They said, "All right, separate and
equal goes out, but we will [allow] the states that have a separate system
[to integrate] 'with all due deliberate speed.' "61 In other words, here
you've got a right, but you can only get it when the state with due delib59. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
60. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
61. Brown v. Board of Edue. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
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erate speed grants it to you, and that had never been done before. But as
I say, that I didn't like, but at the same time, I can recognize the practicalities of it. But the trouble is that the "due deliberate speed" is still
under way, and still hasn't been carried out in certain parts of the South
in terms of dismantling the two separate school systems.
But I suppose if any rule of law irked blacks, it was the one that said
that you can have separate but equal, because there's just no such thing.
When you see in public restrooms, blacks here, whites here, even days
when you went on a train, separate parts of the dining room with the
curtain was for blacks, Brown v. Board of Education was really a signal
victory for the civil rights movement.
Doyle: The Reagan Administration has just come out against busing.62
Do you think we're beginning to regress in that area of civil rights?
Jefferson: Well, I think under the Reagan Administration, yes, we're
regressing. There's just no way that he is willing to stand back of the
gains made in the civil rights field. Consider the people he's appointed
on the Civil Rights Commission. Consider his attitude on thp abortion
issue. His first appointment to the Supreme Court-Justice S mdra Day
O'Conner-the story goes that when Reagan appointed Don Wright as
chief justice, he had in mind that he was going to be a good conservative
chief justice of the California Supreme Court, and he was mistaken. He
was mistaken the same as Eisenhower who appointed Warren as Chief
Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court-he was supposed to have said, "Well,
that's one of the biggest mistakes that [I] made." But I think that Reagan now is making sure of the conservatism of his appointees. At least
he's trying to, and he's succeeded. Justice O'Connor is as conservative as
they come, and I don't think she'll change.
What everybody's wondering about in the next four years, suppose
[William] Brennan goes off, or suppose [Thurgood] Marshall goes off,
then you're not going to have-they're in the minority already-you're
not going to have any liberal voice left, because you have a conservative
Court now, and little by little they're eating away at the Warren Court's
decisions. But they haven't had the nerve to just completely abolish
those things, but, of course, you whittle away and for all intents and
purposes, you ultimately do away with the decision because you leave so
little of it to stand.
62. See Norfolk, Reagan Administration Seeks to End Busing in City's Schools, L.A. Daily
J., Feb. 6, 1985, at 4, col. 3; Reynolds, Desegregation,ReaganStyle: No Busing, L.A. Daily J.,
Oct. 26, 1981, at 4, col. 3 (William Bradford Reynolds is currently the Assistant Attorney
General for Civil Rights in the Reagan Administration).
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For example, the next attack I see is another exception to the exclusionary rule. There is already an exception based on the good faith of the
police officer when a warrant has been issued.63 The next point will be
made, well, if the police arrest somebody without a warrant or search
without a warrant, and they have a good faith belief that they had a right
to do so, that there was an emergency, I think that the present Court
might say, "Well, we made the good faith exception when the police officers have a warrant; if they act without a warrant, if they act in good
faith, isn't that sufficient?" So I don't look with any-well, I say-any
calmness or happiness over what I think is in store for us in the next four
years. I hope I'm wrong.
Doyle: Do you think the public really understands the need to protect
and promote the Bill of Rights?
Jefferson: No, I don't think they do. I think the average person is
merely looking at what is his own personal interest. And his personal
interest would say, "Sure, I'd like to live in a crime-free society and
somehow the system ought to be able to fix it so no crimes are committed." But how many of them ever start thinking about what is the cause
of crime? Is it that we've got the exclusionary rule? Is it that we don't
put everybody behind bars who gets caught? I don't think they stop to
think, "Well, if you've got a class of citizens who have no jobs, no hope,
no opportunity, what have they got to lose when they commit a crime?"
You can't put everybody in prison. They don't want to pay the taxes to
build new prisons.
I don't think many people realize that if you didn't have the Bill of
Rights, you wouldn't have the kind of democratic society that we've got.
You might get a President in there that didn't want the Bill of Rights and
decide what any autocrat might decide [who has] the army [behind] him.
He might do away with rights that any citizen has, and put in martial
law, rule by fiat, and decide we won't have any election next time.
People might say, "Well, that can't happen here." Maybe they said
the same thing in Germany when Hitler came to power. They said the
same thing in Italy when Mussolini came to power; and in the South
American countries. In other words, what I'm suggesting is that people
ought to be serious enough to say, "Well, there's no such thing that can't
happen here." It can happen here if the majority does not support [the]
Bill of Rights, the real bulwark of freedom for everybody.
Doyle: You have some background in history, and maybe this kind of
lends itself to what we've been talking about. Do you think we've really
learned from history or do we just continue to repeat our mistakes?
63. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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Jefferson: The idea that we may not learn from history, but simply repeat our mistakes is a tough one. I think that sometimes we don't seem
to learn from history and yet at other times I think we do. I think we
learn somewhat, although the clock seems to be turned back somewhat, I
just don't think anybody wants to see the clock turned back completely.
It seems to me that nearly everybody would say when a society at least
tries to grant recognition to all segments of the population, that it's a
better society than it was when we didn't grant such rights. There is
more peace in the community. It's not hard to say, for example, why we
had all the student riots and uproar in the '60's. And yet I don't think
anybody would want to see that happen again. Rioting in the streets, the
Watts riots here, Detroit, and elsewhere. I don't believe that people are
so unaware that history can repeat itself, that they will let conditions
develop to the extent that those things will happen again. I don't know if
I've answered your questions. I would like to think that we do learn
something from experience although I'm not sure that we learn all that
we should.
Doyle: When did you first actively become involved in the civil rights
movement?
Jefferson: It was after I came out West to practice law and pretty much
the whole time I was practicing law I got connected with the Urban
League and that was my major interest--contribution, if you want to call
it that-in the field of civil rights.
Doyle: You wrote an article in 1939, entitled, Race Discriminationin
Jury Service.14 In that article you stated:
Had the Supreme Court properly and liberally interpreted the legislation designed to protect the civil rights of the Negro and enforce the guaranties and immunities of the Fourteenth
Amendment, there would have been acceptance of the supervisory
control of the federal courts over the state judicial system, just as
there has been an acceptance of federal judicial control over state
legislation.... With the narrow construction given to the legislative power of Congress over the fifth section of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Negro and other minorities find little solace in the
enlargement of individual freedom and equality which the Amendment was supposed to assure. Perhaps some day the Supreme
Court will withdraw from its collaboration in the partial nullification of the Fourteenth Amendment and assume a broader view of
its protective function. Only then will the constitutional protection
of civil rights and liberties cease to be a vain and transitory

illusion.65

64. Jefferson, Race Discriminationin Jury Service, 19 B.U.L. REV. 413 (1939).
65. Id. at 447.
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How far have we come since you wrote those words over forty-five years
ago?
Jefferson: You have referred to an article I wrote in 1939, dealing with
discrimination in jury service, and in that law review article, I set forth
the position that the U.S. Supreme Court had taken a very narrow view
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It was my thesis that if they had taken a liberal view of interpreting that
section, then what we have now seen as a long and torturous path of
simply interpreting the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment, that process would not have had to take this
long path. Without that interpretation, it has taken a long time for the
Court to finally give an enlarged meaning to what is meant by due process and what is meant by equal protection of the laws. We have reached
a good point in what I was saying back in 1939 of what ought to have
been the law then as to the rights of all citizens for equal protection of
the laws, but it could have been done so easily if we'd had a liberal Court
then that could have taken a different view of what is meant by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. This is the first time since, oh, probably
1940 or 1945, that I've had called to my attention what I said back in
1939. So it's interesting that you dug that up and I can see that I was
setting up a pretty liberal view forty years ago. So I would say that I
have been true to the course of liberalism.
Doyle: Do you think that the election of Mayor [Thomas] Bradley and
other black officials has improved the conditions and perceptions of
blacks in the United States?
Jefferson: Yes, it seems to me that the election of black officials in state
and city government should have an even greater effect than I think it
does have. In other words, it ought to point the way to youngsters coming up to say, "If I struggle hard, there is this opportunity that is open."
So they don't have to take the attitude, for example, that I took when I
looked at the school system in Los Angeles and said there are no black
teachers in the high school, there are no principals, so if I were to become
a teacher, to get a Ph.D., M.A., there won't be any chance for me. But
here where the black youngster can be told, "Bradley was elected as
Mayor of the city not simply because he got black votes. He couldn't
have been elected if all he'd gotten were black votes. He got elected because the overall citizens have always felt that he'd make a good Mayor."
So with that kind of a role model, if you want to call it that, it seems to
me that black youngsters, far more than they do, ought to see that
there's an opportunity that has opened up, that people are now beginning
to recognize that blacks can do a good job in all aspects of life if they're
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prepared, and so get yourself prepared. Go in the path that has now
been pointed out to you.
Doyle: You've been on the board of directors of the Welfare Planning
Council of the Los Angeles Region and a member of the Los Angeles
Area Minority Employment Advisory Council. Do you believe that we
can truly have equal rights without some rough economic equality?
Jefferson: The question that's been asked is whether or not we can have
true equality if we don't have economic equality. I take it that the concern here is if a segment of the community, let's take the black community, basically is well under the economic progress of the majority, is
there any way that you can have any true protection of civil rights? I
would say, "No, that you can't, that obtaining some sort of economic
equality, at least a better spread of earnings among the black as contrasted with the majority community, would, it would appear to me, to
be essential." In other words, even assuming, for example, that we didn't
have the tendency toward segregated communities even though it's not
commanded by law, it would do no good to have freedom of choice on
housing if you have a large segment unable to purchase housing in a
decent community. Therefore, without some sort of economic equality
you're bound to have effectuated differentials in such things as schooling,
because if the blacks haven't the money, then maybe they may be living
in a depressed neighborhood. And with that depressed neighborhood
goes all of-not all, but a lot of-the ills as to police protection, poor
schools, poor community service generally-in the way of parks and general public services-so that somehow the better equalization, I don't
mean the absolute equality, but some upward trend and narrowing the
spread in economic advantages of the black community would appear to
me to be essential if we are to develop decent equality in such things as
housing and schools and community services generally.
Doyle: Do you think the law can play a role in achieving that equality?
Jefferson: Yes, certainly the law can try and I suppose has tried, for
example, to preclude discrimination. And I think this is something that
has to be considered: we're now moving into this doctrine of comparable
worth, it's basically being brought by women now who are saying that if
you're doing comparable jobs, government's got to pay comparable salaries. And it seems to me that if the law develops that way from the
standpoint of governmental jobs, then the next effect is going to be on the
private sector, and I think that the private sector will have to follow suit.
Of course, you still have a basic problem of better training, better education for the black community, because you cannot expect one who graduates and can hardly read to be able to get a job and to get a decent salary,
so that we will still have the problem, it seems to me, of having to some-
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how better our school situation, better the family situation, so that blacks
will be getting a decent education. I had pointed out earlier, for example, that more money is needed to be put into the community schools in
the black neighborhoods so that instead of the usual thirty students to a
class, in those schools where they need that additional help you have
classes of fifteen. 66 Now, if that doesn't happen, then I cannot see how
the educational picture and then the economic picture can really change
to any significant extent.
Doyle: Where do you see the civil rights area going from here?
Jefferson: Well, civil rights will be going in the same direction, but people are just going to have to work harder, it seems to me, to try to make
gains above where we now are. I look at it and it seems to me we're kind
of at a standstill, maybe falling back somewhat, but maybe not, but at
least the progress is no longer there as it was, and all I can say is that
people who have believed in civil rights for all of our citizens must try to
redouble their efforts to see that we just don't-for one thing, that we
don't drift backwards-but that we maintain what we have and then still
go forward. Now, some things tend to stand still a little bit by virtue of
who's in office. I don't think, for example, that [Governor] Deukmejian
is going to do much in terms of, say, putting blacks on the bench or in
other positions, I just don't think he's going to do that. I think Reagan's
the same way. [Jimmy] Carter made a number of federal judge appointments of blacks, that type of thing stands out because it gives people
hope. So I think there's that slowdown, so there has to be the constant
pressures by people to say, "This movement was good for the country, so
regardless of your political persuasion, at least do some things that will
keep the flame alive."
Doyle: Put yourself back in the time frame of the mid-to-late 1960's.
Back then did you think we would be where we are here today?
Jefferson: In a sense I did, because I saw changes taking place even as I
said, going back to where we didn't have all of the decisions, where the
Urban League was beginning to have some effect on ordinary jobs such
as being a salesperson in a department store or driving a streetcar, or
driving a bus-an ordinary job. That they were beginning to say, "Well,
it isn't fair to keep blacks out of this type of employment." And I somehow felt that with Martin Luther King developing his philosophy of
nonviolence but more or less kind of borrowing from [Mahatma] Gandhi
of India-you may do a certain amount of civil disobedience, but be prepared to go to jail for it-that somehow will hit the conscience of people.
Then, on the other hand, I'm not one who preaches violence, but maybe
66. See supra pp. 234-35.
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a combination of nonviolence with some of the violence by-I'm trying
to think of some of these groups that finally got put down-I can't remember now what group it was but they had shootouts with third world
liberation people, whatever they were called, that even some of that violence, it seems to me gave people an idea: "Well, look, we want a peaceful community, but if you stamp on people and step on them all the time
then some violence results. So let's see to it that some advances are
made." That combination of circumstances had to bring us where we
are. Maybe I didn't know how, but I always, somehow always felt, well,
this prejudice just can't last, can't go on. Somehow it's going to get
better. I mean, things are going to get better.
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